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ABSTRACT 
Cara Damiano: Neural Mechanisms of Uncertainty Processing in Children with ASD 
(Under the direction of Gabriel S. Dichter) 
 
 Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by a preference for 
predictability or sameness and difficulty coping with unpredictable or unexpected 
circumstances.  Accordingly, individuals with ASD may be more inclined to engage with 
predictable, non-social stimuli rather than participate in dynamic and unpredictable social 
interactions.  This behavioral pattern may reflect differential mechanisms involved in 
processing uncertain and certain cues and outcomes in individuals with ASD.  Yet, 
despite the prevalence of such symptoms in ASD and their potential role in core ASD 
symptomatology, uncertainty processing in ASD is not well understood and the 
neurobiological mechanisms underlying this atypicality have yet to be studied in this 
population.  Accordingly, the present study aimed to measure neural responses to 
uncertainty in children with ASD versus typically developing (TD) children using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and then to examine how functional 
brain activation during uncertainty was related to a behavioral measure and self- and 
parent-reported responses to uncertainty.  Results indicated that children with ASD 
consistently showed attenuated activation of frontolimbic regions during uncertain cues 
and outcomes across different types of social and non-social stimuli.  Behavioral and self- 
and parent-reported questionnaire measures also indicated atypical responses to 
uncertainty in the ASD group relative to the TD group.  Correlations among neural, 
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behavioral, and questionnaire measures suggested that attenuation of frontolimbic 
activation during uncertain cues and outcomes was associated with more atypical 
responses to uncertainty in the ASD group as indexed by the behavioral and 
questionnaire measures.  These results have important implications for understanding 
core ASD symptomatology, differentiating ASD from other clinical populations, and 
developing interventions designed to support or ameliorate impaired processing of 
uncertainty in ASD.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by impaired social and 
communicative abilities along with restricted and repetitive behaviors and interests (APA, 
2013).  To meet diagnostic criteria for ASD, two of four possible symptoms of restricted 
and repetitive behaviors and interests must be observed.  These symptoms include 
repetitive behaviors, restricted interests, sensory atypicalities, and a preference for 
predictability referred to as insistence on sameness.  The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders—5th Edition (DSM-5) defines insistence on sameness as an 
“inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns of verbal or nonverbal behavior 
(e.g., extreme distress at small changes, difficulties with transitions, rigid thinking 
patterns, greeting rituals, need to take same route or eat the same food every day)” (APA, 
2013).  Since the first description of ASD by Leo Kanner (1943), ASD has been 
associated with a preference for sameness and predictability.  Kanner described this 
cluster of symptoms as “an anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness” 
and explained that “changes of routine, of furniture arrangement, of a pattern, of the order 
in which every day acts are carried out, can drive him [a child with ASD] to despair” 
(Kanner, 1944, pg. 215).  Other early conceptualizations have suggested that individuals 
with ASD tend to have extremely negative reactions to unexpected events (Baron-Cohen, 
1989; Dawson & Lewy, 1989; Hutt, Hutt, Lee, & Ounsted, 1964).  
  
	   3	  
These conceptualizations are supported by empirical evidence that children with 
ASD prefer to engage in predictable or repetitive tasks (Boucher, 1977) and demonstrate 
increased attention to and engagement with objects presented under predictable versus 
unpredictable conditions (Ferrara & Hill, 1980).  Children with ASD also show an 
exaggerated response to changes in their environment (Gomot, Belmonte, Bullmore, 
Bernard, & Baron-Cohen, 2008; Kootz, Marinelli, & Cohen, 1982) and reduced 
exploration of novel or unfamiliar environments (Pierce & Courchesne, 2001).  Adults 
with ASD report that changes in their schedules or transitions are one of the primary 
sources of stress in their lives (Gillott & Standen, 2007).  In addition, recent theoretical 
models have suggested that the ability to process unexpected or unpredictable events and 
make predictions in uncertain circumstances may be the primary deficit in ASD as it 
provides a mechanistic explanation for different aspects of core ASD symptomatology 
(Sinha et al., 2014; Van de Cruys, Evers, Van der Hallen, & Van, 2014).  
This preference for sameness and aversion towards uncertainty may also impact 
social functioning in individuals with ASD given the inherent unpredictable nature of 
social stimuli in the naturalistic environment.  The complexity and dynamicity of human 
interactions make predicting social behavior extremely difficult, even for the most 
socially skilled individuals.  Yet, for individuals with ASD, fundamental deficits in 
perspective-taking and social attention likely make social stimuli even more 
unpredictable (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Dawson et al., 2004).  Thus, a 
preference for predictability in ASD, along with pervasive social deficits, may ultimately 
reduce motivation to attend to and interact with social stimuli in ASD.  Indeed, there is 
substantial evidence that individuals with ASD orient less to social stimuli (Dawson, 
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Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Sasson et al., 2007), show impaired social 
motivation (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Dawson et al., 2004), 
and demonstrate atypical neural responsivity to social stimuli (Delmonte et al., 2012; 
Dichter, Richey, Rittenberg, Sabatino, & Bodfish, 2012; Scott-Van Zeeland, Dapretto, 
Ghahremani, Poldrack, & Bookheimer, 2010).   
In contrast to this pattern of reduced social motivation, individuals with ASD 
often have intense, specialized, and restricted interests referred to as circumscribed 
interests (APA, 2013).  These interests are more intense and less flexible than interests in 
typically developing (TD) children and frequently interfere with the development of 
social relationships and participation in functional activities (Klin, Danovitch, Merz, & 
Volkmar, 2007; Turner-Brown, Lam, Holtzclaw, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2011).  
Interestingly, the most common circumscribed interests in ASD are predictable objects, 
events, or functions (e.g., machines, mechanical systems, vehicles, computers) (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 1999; Turner-Brown et al., 2011).  In addition, individuals with 
ASD show greater neural responsivity to images from typical categories of circumscribed 
interests when compared to a control group (Dichter, Felder, et al., 2012).   However, the 
extent to which the predictability of these objects contributes to their appeal in ASD 
remains unclear.  
This preference for predictability in ASD bears notable resemblance to a construct 
that has been primarily studied in the context of anxiety disorders referred to as 
intolerance of uncertainty (IU) (Rodgers, Glod, Connolly, & McConachie, 2012).  IU has 
been defined as the extent to which an individual has a negative view of uncertainty 
and/or an aversive reaction to uncertainty (Dugas et al., 2007; Dugas, Schwartz, & 
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Francis, 2004).  Elevated levels of IU have been found in many clinical populations, 
including generalized anxiety disorder (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; 
Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000), obsessive–compulsive 
disorder (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), 
social anxiety disorder (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009), psychosis (White & Gumley, 2009, 
2010), and eating disorders (Frank et al., 2012).  In anxiety disorders, IU is expressed as a 
cognitive bias to interpret ambiguous situations as negative (Koerner & Dugas, 2006, 
2008).  This cognitive bias leads to increased worry, in which imagining future negative 
outcomes provides the perception of certainty about the future (Freeston, Rhéaume, 
Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Lachance, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1995).  Worrying 
thus serves as a maladaptive strategy for reducing distress related to uncertainty since it 
ultimately results in the avoidance of uncertainty, which then only further increases 
anxiety about uncertainty (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). 
 More recently, elevated IU has been reported in children with ASD using both 
behavioral and questionnaire measures (Boulter, Freeston, South, & Rodgers, 2013; 
Brosnan, Chapman, & Ashwin, 2014; Wigham, Rodgers, South, McConachie, & 
Freeston, 2014).  Yet, it remains unclear the extent to which the aversion towards 
uncertainty in individuals with ASD resembles IU in anxiety disorders, in which IU is 
based upon the belief that uncertainty necessarily results in negative outcomes (Koerner 
& Dugas, 2006, 2008).  Rather such symptoms in ASD may be attributable to a 
fundamental atypicality in the perception or processing of uncertainty.  In other words, 
although both anxiety and ASD are associated with atypical responses to uncertainty, the 
mechanisms driving these symptoms may be considerably different.  
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 One approach for gaining a clearer understanding of uncertainty processing in 
ASD is to examine functional brain activation during uncertain and certain conditions.  In 
TD samples, the processing of uncertainty has been consistently associated with 
activation of frontal and limbic regions of the brain, including the nucleus accumbens 
(NAc) (Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001; Volz, Schubotz, & Cramon, 2005), 
dorsal striatum (caudate nucleus and putamen) (Delgado, Miller, Inati, & Phelps, 2005; 
Herwig, Kaffenberger, Baumgartner, & Jäncke, 2007; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & 
Glimcher, 2010), insula (Herwig, Kaffenberger, et al., 2007; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, 
Warner, & Platt, 2006; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), amygdala (Herwig, Kaffenberger, et al., 
2007; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), orbital 
frontal cortex (OFC) (Berns et al., 2001; Hsu et al., 2005; Pushkarskaya, Liu, Smithson, 
& Joseph, 2010), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), (Herwig, Kaffenberger, et al., 2007; 
Levy et al., 2010; Schienle, Schäfer, Pignanelli, & Vaitl, 2009), and frontal medial cortex 
(Herwig, Kaffenberger, et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2005; Schienle, Kochel, Ebner, Reishofer, 
& Schafer, 2010).  IU is also positively correlated with frontolimbic activation (e.g., 
insula, amygdala, ACC, frontal medial cortex) during tasks involving uncertainty (Krain 
et al., 2008; Levy et al., 2010; Simmons, Matthews, Paulus, & Stein, 2008) and 
frontolimbic activation increases parametrically with the degree of uncertainty in a task 
(Schlösser et al., 2009; Tobler, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2007; Volz et al., 2005; 
Volz, Schubotz, & Von Cramon, 2003).  
 Evidence for greater frontolimbic activation during uncertainty suggests that 
uncertainty is more salient than certainty to TD individuals and thus a greater degree of 
cognitive resources are devoted to the processing of unpredictability versus predictability 
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(Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Koch et al., 2008; Schlösser et al., 2009; Volz et al., 
2003).   When examining neural responses to uncertainty in different clinical populations, 
distinct patterns of dysfunctional frontolimbic activation may shed light on the specific 
nature of the atypicality in these different populations.  For instance, individuals with 
anxiety disorders consistently demonstrate increased activation of frontolimbic brain 
regions (e.g., OFC, ACC, amygdala) during uncertain tasks (Krain et al., 2008; Yassa, 
Hazlett, Stark, & Hoehn-Saric, 2012) and frontolimbic activation is positively correlated 
with IU in this population (Krain et al., 2008).  Accordingly, distress related to 
uncertainty may enhance its saliency and thus result in increased recruitment of 
frontolimbic regions in individuals with anxiety disorders.  On the other hand, individuals 
with schizophrenia show attenuated frontolimbic activation during uncertain conditions 
and increased striatal activation during certain conditions (Koch et al., 2010; Koch et al., 
2011; Krug et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2011).  These results may suggest that individuals 
with schizophrenia find uncertainty to be less salient and devote fewer cognitive 
resources towards uncertainty processing, resulting in frontolimbic hypoactivation.   
Despite evidence for the high prevalence of IU and insistence on sameness in 
ASD (Boulter et al., 2013; Lam & Aman, 2007; Richler, Bishop, Kleinke, & Lord, 2007) 
and evidence that sameness and ritualistic behaviors in ASD significantly contributes to 
the stress of caregivers and adults with ASD (Gabriels, Cuccaro, Hill, Ivers, & Goldson, 
2005; Gillott & Standen, 2007; Lecavalier, Leone, & Wiltz, 2006), the impact of 
uncertainty on individuals with ASD remains poorly understood and the neural 
mechanisms underlying atypical responding to uncertainty in this population have yet to 
be studied.  In addition, no study to date has manipulated both the predictability and the 
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social nature of stimuli in ASD to understand the extent to which uncertainty may 
influence the processing of social stimuli versus non-social stimuli (e.g., circumscribed 
interests).  Rather, many previous neuroimaging studies comparing social and non-social 
stimuli have presented these stimuli in an uncertain context only, since uncertainty elicits 
maximal activation of frontolimbic circuitry in TD samples (Aron et al., 2004; Berns et 
al., 2001; McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003).  Yet, it remains unclear the extent to 
which predictability alters neural responses to social and non-social stimuli in ASD.   
The Present Study 
The present study investigated the neural mechanisms of uncertainty processing in 
the context of social and non-social stimuli in children with ASD versus TD children and 
examined how differences in these neural responses related to a behavioral uncertainty 
task and self- and parent-reported questionnaires of uncertainty.  The overarching goal of 
the study was to use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to better understand 
the neural circuitry involved in the anticipation and outcome phases of an uncertainty 
task in children with ASD, and to understand how atypical processing of uncertainty may 
influence the aversion towards uncertainty observed in ASD, as well as social and non-
social symptoms associated with ASD.  
The fMRI task was modified from a paradigm previously used to measure neural 
responses to uncertain stimuli (including positively and negatively valenced images; 
Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010).  This task was adapted to include 
three possible types of positively valenced stimuli: (1) social images (i.e., images of a 
happy faces), (2) circumscribed interest images (i.e., a set of images that included typical 
circumscribed interests of individuals with ASD, referred to as High Autism Interest 
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[HAI] stimuli), and (3) images notifying participants of monetary compensation.  These 
stimuli were presented in either a certain or uncertain context.  In the certain condition, a 
positively valenced stimulus was presented in 100% of the trials; in the uncertain 
condition, a positively valenced stimulus was presented in 50% of the trials and a neutral 
image was presented in the remaining 50% of trials.  
The social and circumscribed interest images were included to examine the extent 
to which uncertainty impacts these aspects of ASD symptomatology.  Although 
circumscribed interests of individuals with ASD are, by definition, idiosyncratic, a 
standardized image set was used in the current study to preserve internal validity, since it 
allowed all participants to view the same images.  These images were derived from 
categories of common circumscribed interests in ASD (South, Ozonoff, & McMahon, 
2005) and have been empirically validated as stimuli that are rewarding and/or salient to 
individuals with ASD through a series of studies involving children and adults with ASD 
(Dichter, Felder, et al., 2012; Sasson, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2012; Sasson, Elison, Turner-
Brown, Dichter, & Bodfish, 2011; Sasson, Turner Brown, Holtzclaw, Lam, & Bodfish, 
2008).  The monetary stimuli were included to serve as non-social, positively valenced 
stimuli that are presumably unrelated to ASD symptomatology, and the neutral condition 
was included to examine responses to uncertainty independently of the possible salience 
of social, circumscribed interest, or monetary stimuli.   
The second objective of the present study was to study the performance of 
children with ASD on a behavioral measure of uncertainty processing in socially relevant 
and non-socially relevant contexts.  This behavioral measure, referred to as the beads task, 
was used to assess the extent to which children with ASD sought increased certainty in an 
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uncertain situation (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; Phillips & Edwards, 1966).  In this 
task, participants are shown two jars with different ratios of two colors of beads (the non-
social condition) or two types of emotional faces (the social condition).  Participants view 
bead or face images drawn from one of the jars one-by-one until they are ready to guess 
from which jar the beads/faces are being drawn.  This task is based on evidence that 
individuals with high levels of IU tend to seek more information before making a 
decision in an uncertain context (Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997b).  Indeed, 
individuals with elevated levels of IU draw more beads before reaching a decision in this 
task (Broome et al., 2007; Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997a), particularly under 
conditions of maximal uncertainty (i.e., when the jars have a nearly equal ratio of one 
type of bead to the other).  Individuals from clinical populations associated with atypical 
responding to uncertainty (e.g., ASD, anxiety, psychosis, eating disorders) also tend to 
use atypical strategies in reaching this decision, as they either draw relatively more 
beads/faces or draw only one or two beads/faces before making a decision—a strategy 
referred to as “jumping to conclusions” (Broome et al., 2007; Brosnan et al., 2014; Jänsch 
& Hare, 2014; Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011).  A recent study involving a non-
social version of the beads task found that adolescents with ASD draw more beads than 
TD adolescents before reaching a decision (Brosnan et al., 2014).  However, this study 
did not include social versions of this task and did not examine performance under 
different degrees of uncertainty.  Therefore, the present study expanded upon this 
previous study by including both social and non-social conditions, as well as conditions 
with low and high levels of uncertainty.  
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The third objective of the present study was to examine self- and parent-reported 
responses to uncertainty (as indexed by IU and insistence on sameness), as well as 
possible relations among these reported responses to uncertainty and the severity of ASD 
symptoms, anxiety, and other relevant variables (such as age and IQ) in children with 
ASD.  We also examined correlations among the magnitudes of neural responses to 
uncertain cues and outcomes in the fMRI task and the behavioral and self-/parent-report 
measures of responses to uncertainty in each group.   
Our overarching hypothesis was that children with ASD, compared to TD 
children, would show attenuated responses in frontolimbic circuitry to uncertain cues and 
outcomes and increased frontolimbic activation for certain cues and outcomes across all 
stimulus conditions.  This hypothesis is based on evidence implicating frontolimbic 
circuitry in the processing of uncertainty (e.g., Huettel et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2008; 
Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), along with evidence that individuals with ASD show less 
engagement with unpredictable stimuli (Boucher, 1977; Ferrara & Hill, 1980) and 
reduced neural responsivity to novel or unexpected auditory stimuli (Courchesne, Kilman, 
Galambos, & Lincoln, 1984; Courchesne, Lincoln, Kilman, & Galambos, 1985; Gomot et 
al., 2006).  We also hypothesized that individuals with ASD would demonstrate increased 
frontolimbic activation to non-social versus social stimuli during uncertainty given that 
non-social stimuli are associated with greater predictability.  Similarly, we predicted that 
children with ASD would draw more beads/faces (i.e., a response consistent with a 
greater aversion to uncertainty) in the social and non-social conditions of the beads task.  
We also hypothesized that children with ASD and their parents would report more 
symptoms of IU and insistence on sameness when compared to TD children and their 
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parents and that these measures would be related to ASD and anxiety symptoms.  Finally, 
we expected that neural responses in frontolimbic regions during uncertain cues and 
outcomes in the ASD group would be negatively associated with behavioral and 
questionnaire measures of atypical responding to uncertainty.   
METHODS 
Participants 
This study included 29 children with ASD and 21 TD children ranging in age 
from 9 to 18 years old.  For the fMRI analyses, three participants with ASD were 
excluded due to falling asleep in the scanner and/or excessive head motion during the 
fMRI task (> 5mm along any of the six possible axes, including x, y, z, pitch, yaw, and 
roll).  The final sample for the fMRI and questionnaire results included 26 children with 
ASD (24 males, 2 females) and 21 TD children (19 males, 2 females) (see Table 1 for 
participant characteristics).  Of these 26 participants, three participants with ASD 
demonstrated excessive movement in one or two of the scan runs and thus these runs 
were selectively dropped from the fMRI analyses.  A subset of the participants who 
completed the fMRI scan session returned on a separate day to complete the behavioral 
component of the study (the beads task).  This subset included sixteen participants with 
ASD (15 males, 1 female; age 9 to 18 years) and 12 TD participants (9 males, 3 females; 
9 to 17 years).  No significant differences were found between the ASD and TD groups in 
age, sex, IQ (full-scale, verbal, or non-verbal scores), or ethnicity in either the full 
participant sample or the subset of participants who completed the beads task, p > .05 for 
all comparisons (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations from the full participant 
sample).  In addition, for participants included in the final fMRI analyses, no significant 
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differences were detected between groups in mean absolute head motion along the six 
possible axes (x, y, z, pitch, yaw, and roll) for any of the fMRI runs included in the 
analyses, p > .05 (see Table 1 for mean absolute head motion and standard deviations in 
each group).   
Participants with ASD were recruited through the Carolina Institute of 
Developmental Disabilities (CIDD) Autism Research Registry and TD participants were 
recruited through the CIDD Child Development Research Registry.  Inclusion criteria for 
all participants were (1) a full scale IQ score > 70 determined through administration of 
the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT) (Kaufman, 1990), (2) no known medical or 
genetic condition associated with ASD (e.g., Fragile X syndrome, Rett syndrome), (3) no 
severe sensory or motor impairment, (4) no history of neurological injury, head trauma, 
poorly-controlled seizure disorder (seizure within the preceding six months), stroke, or 
prior neurosurgery, and (5) no implanted medical devices or any other MRI 
contraindications.  In addition, all female participants above 12 years old were required to 
demonstrate a negative result on the QuickVue+ One-step hCG test, which is a sensitive 
immunoassay for the early detection of pregnancy. Thirteen children with ASD were 
taking psychotropic medications, including antihypertensives/central alpha-2 adrenergic 
agonists (Tenex, Clonidine, Intuniv), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (Citalopram, 
Lexapro), atypical anti-psychotics (Risperdal, Abilify), psychostimulants (Vyvanse, 
Adderall), and a norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (Strattera). 	  
Participants in the ASD group met the Diagnostic Statistical Manual – 4th Edition 
(DSM-IV) criteria for a clinical diagnosis of ASD through an evaluation by a licensed 
clinical psychologist and met standard algorithm cutoffs for ASD on the Autism 
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Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) (Lord et al., 2000) administered by research-
reliable raters.  TD children did not have any first-degree relatives with diagnoses of 
ASD (according to parent report) and scored below the clinical threshold on an ASD 
screening measure—the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) (Rutter, Bailey, & 
Lord, 2003).  	  
fMRI Paradigm 
Each fMRI session included three runs (one run per each of the three stimulus 
types—monetary, HAI, and social stimuli).  Each run included three possible cues: 1) a 
cue indicating 50% chance of a subsequent monetary, HAI, or social image and 50% 
chance of a subsequent neutral image (“uncertain cue”), (2) a cue indicating 100% chance 
of a subsequent positively valenced image (monetary, HAI, or social image) (“certain 
positive cue”), and (3) a cue indicating 100% chance of a neutral image (“certain neutral 
cue”).  These three cues resulted in four possible outcomes: (1) a monetary, HAI or social 
image that followed an uncertain cue (“uncertain positive outcome”), (2) a neutral image 
that followed an uncertain cue (“uncertain neutral outcome”), (3) a monetary, HAI or 
social image that followed a certain cue (“certain positive outcome”), and (4) a neutral 
image that followed a certain cue (“certain neutral outcome”).  See Figure 1 for a 
depiction of possible cues and outcomes in this task.  An image of a button box (identical 
to the button box on which participants’ fingers rested throughout the entirety of the 
fMRI session) was also randomly interspersed throughout each run.  This image, which 
prompted participants to press the response button on their own button box, was included 
to confirm that participants were attending to the task.  The cue image for uncertainty was 
“?” in every run.  The cues “X” or “O” were paired with either positively valenced 
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images (i.e., monetary, HAI, and social images) or neutral images and cue-outcome 
pairings were alternated and counterbalanced across participants.  Each trial consisted of 
an anticipation phase (i.e., presentation of a cue) and an outcome phase (i.e., presentation 
of a monetary, HAI, social, or neutral image).  We differentiated between the neural 
mechanisms related to each of these temporal phases, as these phases have been 
associated with dissociable mechanisms in previous studies of uncertainty processing 
(Huettel et al., 2006; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010).  
Prior to scanning, participants completed a mock scanning session to simulate the 
experience of the fMRI scan and thereby habituate participants to this experience.  After 
the mock scan, participants completed a brief training to learn cue-outcome pairings for 
the fMRI task.  Participants were then tested on these pairings and training was repeated 
until cue-outcome accuracy was > 75% accuracy.  Each run began with a 10-sec 
instructional screen providing a brief summary of the task instructions and a reminder of 
the cue-outcome pairings.  Each trial consisted of the following: (1) presentation of a cue 
for 2000 ms, (2) a variable inter-stimulus interval which consisted of a blank screen for 
2000, 4000, 6000, or 8000 ms; (3) presentation of the outcome image for 2000 ms, and 
(4) a blank screen for 5000 ms. The timing of button box trials, however, included only 
the presentation of a button box image for 2000 ms, followed by a 5000 ms blank screen 
before the subsequent trial.  The random presentation of the button box stimulus, as well 
as the variable inter-stimulus interval in each trial, helped to maximize the signal-to-noise 
ratio and optimize the study design efficiency (Burock, Buckner, Woldorff, Rosen, & 
Dale, 1998; Dale, 1999).  Stimuli were presented using E-Prime (Psychology Software 
Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) through magnet-compatible goggles (Resonance Technology, 
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Inc., Northridge CA).  The three runs were presented in a randomized order, counter-
balanced across participants within each group.  Task conditions and trial timings are 
summarized in Figure 1.  
Stimuli 
 See Figure 1 for examples of each stimulus type and see Appendix 1 for lists of 
all images included in the fMRI task.  
Monetary Stimuli 
In trials with uncertain or certain positive outcomes in the monetary run, 
participants saw a large “$” symbol in white against a black background, indicating that 
participants would be provided with $1 per positive outcome trial at the conclusion of the 
fMRI session.  At the bottom of the screen, participants were shown the total amount of 
money they had won thus far in the task.  
Social Stimuli 
Uncertain and certain positive outcomes of the social run included 18 faces with 
positive affective expressions (female, closed, smiling mouth) from the NimStim set of 
faces (Tottenham et al., 2009).  Faces with positive affect reliably recruit frontolimbic 
circuitry in children and adolescents with and without ASD (Delmonte et al., 2012; Monk 
et al., 2008; Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010), suggesting that these images can serve as 
positive and salient social proxies. 
High Autism Interest (HAI) Stimuli 
Previously reported gender-specific valence and arousal ratings from individuals 
with ASD (Sasson et al., 2012) were used to choose the most salient 18 HAI images for 
the present study.  The 18 HAI images for male participants included stimuli related to: 
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videogame systems and other electronics (5 images), trains (3 images), cars (4 images), 
blocks (3 images), aircraft (2 images), and clocks (1 image).  The 18 HAI images for 
female participants included stimuli related to: videogame systems and other electronics 
(3 images), trains (4 images), cars (3 images), blocks (3 images), and aircraft (5 images).  
Neutral Stimuli 
All three runs (monetary, HAI, and social runs) included neutral stimuli.  Neutral 
stimuli in the monetary run consisted of a large “*” symbol in white against a black 
background along with the total number of times that participants had seen a “*” symbol 
at the bottom of the screen.  Participants were instructed that this symbol indicated that 
they had not won money.  The neutral stimuli in the social and HAI runs included neutral 
images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1997).  Based on normative data of valence and arousal ratings for these images 
(Lang et al., 1997) and excluding any images related to common circumscribed interests 
for individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 1999; Turner-Brown et al., 
2011), the 36 images (18 for the social run and 18 for the HAI run) with the most neutral 
valence ratings and lowest arousal ratings were chosen (see Appendix 1 for lists of IAPS 
images included in each run).  No significant differences were found between the average 
valence ratings for the IAPS images used in the HAI run (M = 5.00; SD = 0.13; range: 
4.82 – 5.22) and the IAPS images in the social run (M = 5.00; SD = 0.12; range: 4.72 – 
5.19) (with the most neutral rating for images being 5 on a Likert scale of 1 to 9), t(34) = 
0.17, p = .86, or for the average arousal ratings for images in the HAI run (M = 2.92; SD 
= 0.53; range: 1.72 – 4.14) and the social run (M = 2.84; SD = 0.49; range: 2.00 – 4.02) 
(with the lowest arousal rating being 1 on a Likert scale of 1 to 9), t(34) = 0.42, p = .68.  
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These IAPS images included common household objects (e.g., spoon, light bulb, cup), 
furniture (e.g., chair, filing cabinet), clothing (e.g., shoes, jackets), and other common 
objects or patterns.  In order to match stimuli on basic visual properties, the background 
color of the face and HAI images were altered to match the background of the respective 
IAPS images in each run.  
fMRI Acquisition  
Scanning was performed on a General Electric (Wakuesha, Wisconsin, USA) 3.0 
Tesla Signa Excite HD scanner.  This scanner was equipped with high-power, high-duty-
cycle 50-mTesla/m gradients at 200 Tesla/m/s slew rate and 32-channel head coil.  
During each scan session, an eye-tracking device was used to monitor participants and 
record any instances in which they appeared drowsy or fell asleep (in which case the run 
was excluded from analyses).  Participants were provided with a bimanual button box, 
which rested on their torso throughout the scan.  Participants were instructed to press 
only the first button with their index finger.  
High-resolution T1-weighted structural images were collected for coregistration 
with the functional images using a 3D FSPGR BRAVO sequence, with a repetition time 
(TR) of 7.584 ms, an echo time (TE) of 2.936 ms, a field of view of 256 mm, a matrix 
size of 256 x 256 x 162, a flip angle of 12°, and a voxel size of 1 x 1 x 1 mm.  These 
structural images were aligned in the near axial plane defined by the anterior and 
posterior commissures.   
Functional whole brain images were acquired using a spiral pulse sequence with 
sensitivity-encoded parallel imaging (SENSE) reconstruction sensitive to blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast.  A total of 302 volumes were acquired 
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with a TR of 1500 ms, a TE of 30 ms, a field of view of 240 mm, a matrix size of 64 x 64 
x 34, a flip angle of 60°, and a voxel size of 3.75 x 3.75 x 4.00 mm.  The first four 
functional volumes in each run were discarded to allow for steady state equilibrium.   
Behavioral Measure (Beads Task) 
The beads task, a well-validated probabilistic inference task (Huq et al., 1988; 
Phillips & Edwards, 1966), was used as a behavioral measure of responses to uncertainty.  
In this task, participants are shown two jars containing two different types of beads or 
two different types of emotional face images with each jar containing a different ratio of 
beads/faces (see Figure 2).  Participants are then presented with a series of bead/face 
images that have been drawn one-by-one from one of the two jars with replacement.  
After each bead/face is drawn, participants are asked whether they are ready to decide 
from which jar the beads/faces have been drawn or whether they would like to see more 
beads/faces before making a decision.  
Participants completed an online version of this task using survey software 
(Qualtrics®).  In line with previous studies of the beads task (Garety et al., 2005; 
Sternheim et al., 2011), this task included four conditions: high-uncertainty social, low-
uncertainty social, high-uncertainty non-social, and low-uncertainty non-social conditions 
(see Figure 2 for a depiction of all task conditions).  The high-uncertainty non-social 
condition included a jar with a 60:40 purple bead to green bead ratio and another jar with 
a 40:60 purple to green bead ratio.  The low-uncertainty non-social condition included 
one jar with an 85:15 blue to red bead ratio and a second jar with an 15:85 blue to red 
bead ratio.  The social conditions included a high-uncertainty condition (60:40 ratio) and 
a low-uncertainty condition (85:15 ratio) with emotional face images (happy and angry 
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faces) in the place of beads.  These images included faces of male and female children 
with happy and angry expressions from the National Institute of Mental Health Child 
Emotional Faces Picture set (Egger et al., 2011).   
Participants also completed a practice task that included jars with a 90:10 black to 
white bead ratio and 10:90 black to white ratio.  The order of the first 20 beads/faces was 
modeled after Garety and colleagues (2005) and the following sequence was determined 
using a random number generator.  In line with previous research (Sternheim et al., 2011), 
participants were permitted to choose up to 30 beads/faces before making a final decision.  
Because ASD has previously been associated with deficits in working memory 
particularly for faces (Koshino et al., 2008; Steele, Minshew, Luna, & Sweeney, 2007), 
the beads/faces drawn were presented at the bottom of the screen.  
 After completing each of the four task conditions, participants answered four 
questions using a visual analogue scale on the computer screen that ranged from 0 (Not 
At All) to 100 (Very Much).  These questions included: (a) “How certain are you about 
your decision?”, (b) “How distressed do you feel right now?”, (c) “How confident do you 
feel about your decision?”, and (d) “How important is it for you to get the answer right?”. 
Questionnaire Measures of Uncertainty Processing and Clinical Symptomatology 
IU was measured through the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale: Child-report and 
Parent-report versions (IUS-C, IUS-P; Comer et al., 2009).  The original Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS) is a 27-item self-report questionnaire designed for adults that 
indexes the extent to which an individual endorses negative cognitions about uncertainty 
and its consequences (Freeston et al., 1994).  This questionnaire was originally written in 
French but has since been translated into English (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) and Dutch (de 
  
	   21	  
Bruin, Rassin, van der Heiden, & Muris, 2006).  All versions have been found to be 
psychometrically sound measures of IU, with high levels of internal consistency, test-
retest reliability, and convergent validity (e.g., correlated with symptoms of worry, 
anxiety, and depression) (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; de Bruin et al., 2006; Freeston et al., 
1994). 
Comer and colleagues (2009) adapted the IUS for use with children by creating 
the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children with both a child self-report form (IUS-
C) and a parallel parent-report form (IUS-P).  Both forms were found to have excellent 
internal consistency and convergent validity in populations of approximately the same 
age range as the present study (Boelen, Vrinssen, & Van Tulder, 2010; Comer et al., 
2009; Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski, 2012).  In addition, the IUS-C has shown 
acceptable internal consistency and the IUS-P has shown excellent internal consistency in 
an ASD population of about the same age range as the present study (Boulter et al., 2013).  
Both child-report and parent-report versions include 27 items with a five-point Likert 
scale for each item ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of me [or my child]) to 5 
(entirely characteristic of me [or my child]).  Individual differences in the parent and 
child versions of the IUS have previously been associated with behavioral responses to 
uncertainty (Ladouceur et al., 1997b; Nelson & Shankman, 2011) and frontolimbic 
activation during uncertainty processing fMRI tasks (Krain et al., 2008; Schienle et al., 
2010; Simmons et al., 2008).  
Participants with ASD completed the ADOS and participants with and without 
ASD completed the ADOS and Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) as measures of ASD 
symptomatology.  The ADOS (Lord et al., 2000), as described above, is a semi-structured 
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observational assessment used to evaluate current symptoms of ASD.  The ADOS has 
demonstrated strong psychometric properties, including test–retest reliability, 
interobserver agreement, and reliable diagnostic classification.  In the present study, 
research-reliable assessors administered the ADOS to all participants with ASD.  Raw 
ADOS scores were then used to obtain calibrated continuous measures of ASD severity, 
which were calculated per the metric developed to standardize these scores across 
different modules of the ADOS (Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2009; Hus, Gotham, & Lord, 
2012).  The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino & Gruber, 2002) is a 65-
item parent-report questionnaire designed to quantitatively measure the severity of autism 
symptoms in individuals from 4 to 18 years.  The SRS has shown good test-retest 
reliability, cross-cultural validity, and convergent and divergent validity (Bölte, Poustka, 
& Constantino, 2008; Constantino et al., 2003; Constantino, Przybeck, Friesen, & Todd, 
2000).  The SRS generates a total t-score as a standardized measure of ASD severity. 
Scores on the Ritualistic/Sameness Behavior subscales of the Repetitive Behavior 
Scale-Revised (RBS-R) were used as a measure of the severity of insistence on sameness 
symptoms (Bodfish, Symons, & Lewis, 1999).  The RBS-R is a 43-item clinical rating 
scale designed for parents of children with ASD with six subscales (Stereotyped Behavior, 
Self-injurious Behavior, Compulsive Behavior, Ritualistic Behavior, Sameness Behavior, 
and Restricted Behavior).  The 17 items on the Ritualistic/Sameness subscales of the 
RBS-R were adapted from the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord, Rutter, & 
Couteur, 1994), the Sameness Questionnaire (Prior & Macmillan, 1973), and the 
Abnormal Focused Affections Checklist (Schultz & Berkson, 1995).  The 
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Ritualistic/Sameness Behavior subscales of the RBS-R has been found to have excellent 
internal consistency and acceptable interrater reliability (Lam & Aman, 2007).   
The Revised Children’s Anxiety and Depression Scale (RCADS; Chorpita, Yim, 
Moffitt, Umemoto, & Francis, 2000) is a 47-item parent-report questionnaire that 
measures symptoms of anxiety and depression.  This measure generates scores for six 
subscales (including social phobia, separation anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and major depressive disorder 
subscales), a Total Anxiety score (sum of the five anxiety subscales), and a Total 
Internalizing scale (sum of all six subscales).  This measure has been validated for 
indexing symptoms of anxiety and depression in children with ASD (Hallett et al., 2013; 
Sterling et al., 2014).  
The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Disorders-Revised (SCARED) (Birmaher et 
al., 1997) is a 41-item parent-report measure of anxiety symptoms that indexes symptoms 
of panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder, social anxiety 
disorder, and school phobia.  This measure has been found to have good internal 
consistency, construct validity, and discriminant validity (Birmaher et al., 1999; Monga 
et al., 2000).  Like the RCADS, this scale has been used previously as a measure of 
anxiety symptoms in studies involving children with ASD (Reaven, Blakeley-Smith, 
Culhane-Shelburne, & Hepburn, 2012; South, Dana, White, & Crowley, 2011).  
Data Analysis 
 Functional data were preprocessed using FSL version 4.1.4 (Oxford Centre for 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain Software Library, Oxford 
University, U.K.).  Preprocessing included the following steps: (1) brain extraction 
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(Smith, 2002), (2) motion correction using MCFLIRT, an intra-model motion correction 
tool (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002), (3) spatial smoothing using a 
Gaussian kernel of full width at half maximum (FWHM) 5 mm, (4) mean-based intensity 
normalization of all volumes by the same factor, and (5) high-pass filtering.  Functional 
and structural images were co-registered in native space and normalized to a standard 
stereotaxic space (Montreal Neurological Institute; MNI).  Registrations were applied 
using an intermodal registration tool (Jenkinson et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2004) and 
voxel-wise temporal autocorrelation was estimated and corrected using FSL’s Improved 
Linear Model (Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). 
 Event onset times were used to model signal responses containing a regressor for 
each response type convolved with a double-γ function to model the hemodynamic 
response.  Using a mixed effects higher-level analysis with Bayesian estimation 
techniques, whole-brain images of parameter estimates and variances were generated.  
Based on previous studies of uncertainty processing (e.g., Huettel et al., 2006; Krain et al., 
2008; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), we applied a small volume correction which included 
several limbic regions of interest (i.e., bilateral amygdala, NAc, caudate nucleus, 
putamen, and thalamus) and several frontal regions (i.e., bilateral insula, ACC, OFC, 
frontal pole, middle frontal gyrus, paracingulate gyrus, subcallosal cortex, frontal medial 
cortex, precentral and postcentral gyri, juxtapositional lobule cortex, superior frontal 
gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus).  This mask was binarized, thresholded at 25%, and then 
merged using FSLMaths.  All of the regions included in the mask were anatomically-
defined using the Harvard–Oxford subcortical probabilistic atlas for subcortical regions 
(Desikan et al., 2006) and the MNI structural probabilistic atlas for cortical regions 
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(Mazziotta et al., 2001).  
All fMRI analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons to obtain a cluster-
corrected threshold of p < .05, across all voxels within the frontolimbic small volume 
correction described above.  The software program AlphaSim (Ward, 2000) was used to 
conduct 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations to determine the minimum cluster size to achieve 
this cluster-corrected threshold.  Using these analyses within the frontolimbic mask, 
clusters were considered significant if they met criteria of p < .01 for a single voxel and a 
minimum cluster size of 38.5 voxels (308 mm3).  
 The following analyses were conducted to address the study aims: 
1) To investigate the domain-general neural correlates of uncertainty processing 
during the anticipation and outcome phases of uncertainty: Parameter estimates 
were generated to reflect the processing of uncertain cues and outcomes and 
compared to baseline activation.  These parameter estimates were then combined 
across all run types for each participant at the second level of analyses and 
submitted to between-group analyses.  In addition, clusters were identified that 
showed a significant Group (ASD, TD) x Uncertainty (Uncertain Cues/Outcomes, 
Certain Cues/Outcomes) interaction.  
2) To study the neural correlates of uncertainty processing for different stimulus 
types during the anticipation and outcome phases of uncertainty:  For each 
stimulus type (neutral, monetary, HAI, and social images), between-group 
differences in the average signal change from baseline were calculated for 
uncertain and certain cues and outcomes.  To directly compare activation for 
uncertain cues and outcomes across stimulus types, parameter estimates from 
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clusters that differentiated the ASD versus TD groups for the contrast of uncertain 
versus certain neutral cues and outcomes were submitted to 2 (Stimulus Type: 
Monetary, HAI, Social) x 2 (Group: ASD, TD) ANOVAs.   
3) To examine behavioral responses to uncertainty: A 2 (Uncertainty: High-
Uncertainty, Low-Uncertainty) x 2(Condition: Social, Non-Social) x 2 (Group: 
ASD, TD) ANOVA was conducted to investigate how these factors influenced the 
primary dependent variable (the number of beads/faces drawn before reaching a 
decision).  We also examined potential differences in the proportion of 
participants who used the “jumping to conclusions” strategy (i.e., making a 
decision after drawing only one or two beads/faces) using Chi-square tests.   
4) To better understand child- and parent-reported responses to uncertainty: 
Between-group t-tests were used to examine potential differences between the 
ASD and TD groups for IUS-P and IUS-C scores.  In addition, correlations 
between IUS-C and IUS-P scores and within-group t-tests comparing the IUS-C 
versus the IUS-P were conducted.  To better understand the nature of IU in 
children with ASD and its relation to clinical symptomatology, exploratory 
correlations were also conducted among IUS-C and IUS-P scores, insistence on 
sameness symptoms (as indexed by the RBS-R Ritualized/Sameness Behavior 
subscales), ASD symptomatology (as measured by calibrated severity scores from 
the ADOS in the ASD group and SRS scores in both groups), measures of anxiety 
(total scores from the RCADS and SCARED), and other relevant demographic 
variables (age and IQ scores). 
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5) To examine correlations among brain activation during the anticipation and 
outcome phases of uncertainty and behavioral and questionnaire measures of 
uncertainty processing: Parameter estimates were derived from the clusters that 
differentiated groups for the contrast of uncertain versus certain neutral cues and 
outcomes.  For each group, correlations were calculated between the magnitude of 
brain activation during uncertain cues and outcomes of these parameter estimates 
across all runs and the primary dependent variables from the beads task (the 
average number of beads/faces drawn before reaching a decision in the social and 
non-social conditions), as well as scores from the IUS-C and IUS-P and the 
Sameness/Ritualistic Behavior subscales of the RBS-R.   
RESULTS 
fMRI Results: Anticipation Phase 
Domain-General Processing of Uncertain Cues 
Analyses were first conducted to examine between-group differences in uncertain 
cues across all runs.  During the presentation of uncertain cues, the ASD group 
demonstrated significantly attenuated activation in several limbic regions (bilateral 
thalamus and right putamen/caudate nucleus) and several frontal regions (right frontal 
pole, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, right middle frontal gyrus, right precentral gyrus, left 
postcentral gyrus, and left juxtapositional lobule cortex) (see Table 2 and Figure 3).  A 
Group x Uncertainty interaction was found in the right dorsal striatum (including 
putamen and caudate nucleus), right OFC, right frontal medial cortex, and left precentral 
gyrus, with the ASD group showing greater activation in these regions for certain versus 
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uncertain cues and the TD group showing greater activation in these regions for uncertain 
versus certain cues (see Table 3).   
Neutral Cues 
For certain neutral cues across all runs, the ASD group demonstrated increased 
activation in the right ventral striatum and right dorsal striatum, including the NAc and 
caudate nucleus, as well as a number of right frontal regions, including the frontal 
operculum cortex, insula, OFC, frontal pole, paracingulate gyrus, ACC, middle frontal 
gyrus, and superior frontal gyrus (see Table 4 and Figure 4).  
Monetary Cues 
During uncertain cues in the monetary run, the ASD group demonstrated reduced 
activation of the right thalamus relative to the TD group (see Table 5 and Figure 5).  
During the presentation of certain monetary cues, the ASD group demonstrated reduced 
activation of the left thalamus, left OFC, bilateral frontal pole, left inferior frontal gyrus, 
right precentral gyrus, left postcentral gyrus, right middle frontal gyrus, and right 
paracingulate gyrus/ACC (see Table 6 and Figure 6).  
Circumscribed Interest Cues 
During uncertain cues in the circumscribed interest (i.e., HAI) run, the ASD group 
demonstrated reduced activation of the left caudate nucleus/NAc, right putamen, bilateral 
frontal pole, left middle frontal gyrus, left paracingulate gyrus, and right precentral gyrus 
(see Table 5 and Figure 5).  During certain HAI cues, the ASD group demonstrated 
reduced activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus, right paracingulate gyrus, and right 
precentral gyrus (see Table 6 and Figure 6).  
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Social Cues 
During uncertain social cues, the ASD group demonstrated significantly 
attenuated activation of the right caudate nucleus, left inferior frontal gyrus, and left 
postcentral gyrus (see Table 5 and Figure 5).  For certain social cues, no significant 
differences were detected between the ASD and TD group.   
Differences Among Stimulus Types 
Parameter estimates were calculated for clusters with between-group differences 
in the contrast of uncertain versus certain neutral cues.  Stimulus Type (Money, HAI, 
Social) x Group (ASD, TD) ANOVAs were then conducted for each of the ten clusters 
identified.  These functional regions of interest (ROIs) included the right OFC, left 
amygdala, right frontal operculum cortex/insula, left putamen, left frontal pole, left 
thalamus, right caudate nucleus, right precentral gyrus, left postcentral gyrus, and right 
juxtapositional lobule cortex.  To correct for multiple comparisons, the sequential 
Bonferroni-Holm procedure (Holm, 1979) was used to determine the significance of 
effects in each cluster.   No significant interactions of Stimulus Type x Group were found 
when either corrected or uncorrected for multiple comparisons.  Using the Bonferroni-
Holm procedure, no main effects of Stimulus Type were detected.  However, when the 
uncorrected results were examined, a main effect of Stimulus Type was detected in the 
right precentral gyrus, F(2,44) = 5.57, p = .007, and the left precentral gyrus, F (2,44) = 
4.70, p = .014.  Post-hoc t-tests revealed that activation in the right precentral gyrus was 
significantly greater for uncertain cues in the monetary run versus the social run, t(46) = 
3.24, p = .002, and HAI run, t(46) = 2.72, p = .009.  Similarly, activation in the left 
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precentral gyrus was significantly greater for uncertain cues in the monetary run relative 
to the social run, t(46) = 2.35, p = .023, and HAI run, t(46) = 2.78, p = .008. 
fMRI Results: Outcome Phase 
Domain-General Processing of Uncertain Outcomes 
During uncertain neutral outcomes, the ASD group demonstrated attenuated 
activation in a cluster that included that left frontal operculum cortex/insula/OFC and the 
bilateral ACC (see Table 7 and Figure 7).  During uncertain positive outcomes, no 
clusters were found to have significantly different activation in the ASD versus TD group.  
A Group x Uncertainty interaction was found in the left central opercular 
cortex/insula and left frontal pole with the ASD group showing significantly greater 
activation in these regions for certain versus uncertain neutral outcomes and the TD 
group showing greater activation for the uncertain versus certain neutral outcomes (see 
Table 8).  No significant clusters were detected for the Group x Uncertainty interaction 
during uncertain positive outcomes.  
Neutral Outcomes 
During certain neutral outcomes across all runs, the ASD group demonstrated 
greater activation of a cluster that included the right caudate nucleus and right thalamus 
(see Table 9 and Figure 8).  
Monetary Run Outcomes 
During uncertain neutral outcomes in the monetary run, the ASD group showed 
hypoactivation of a left frontal cluster that included the insula and OFC (see Table 10 and 
Figure 9).  For uncertain positive monetary outcomes, the ASD group demonstrated 
reduced activation of the right caudate (see Table 11 and Figure 10).  During certain 
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monetary outcomes, the ASD group showed reduced activation of the bilateral 
paracingulate gyrus, bilateral frontal pole, and left superior frontal gyrus (see Table 12 
and Figure 11).  
Circumscribed Interest Run Outcomes 
For uncertain neutral outcomes during the HAI run, the ASD group demonstrated 
decreased activation of the left central opercular cortex/insula and the right inferior 
frontal gyrus/OFC, and increased activation of the left frontal pole, right precentral gyrus, 
and left superior frontal gyrus (see Table 10 and Figure 9).  For uncertain positive HAI 
outcomes, the ASD group showed reduced activation in the right OFC and right thalamus 
(see Table 11 and Figure 10).  During certain HAI outcomes, the ASD group showed 
attenuated activation of the left middle frontal gyrus and greater activation of the left 
ACC (see Table 12 and Figure 11).  
Social Run Outcomes 
For uncertain neutral outcomes during the social run, the ASD group showed 
reduced activation of a cluster that included the left caudate nucleus and thalamus and the 
left superior frontal gyrus (see Table 10 and Figure 9).  For uncertain positive social 
outcomes, the ASD group demonstrated greater activation of the right middle frontal 
gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus (see Table 11 and Figure 10).  During certain social 
outcomes, the ASD group demonstrated reduced activation of the bilateral frontal pole 
(see Table 12 and Figure 11).   
Differences Among Stimulus Types 
Parameter estimates were calculated for clusters with between-group differences 
for the contrast of uncertain versus certain neutral outcomes.  Stimulus Type (Money, 
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HAI, Social) x Group (ASD, TD) ANOVAs were then conducted for each of nine 
functional ROIs detected with this contrast, which included the right caudate 
nucleus/NAc, left OFC, right inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral thalamus, bilateral central 
opercular cortex/insula, left frontal pole, right caudate, and right ACC.  No main effects 
were found for Stimulus Type x Group for either the corrected or uncorrected analyses.  
Using the sequential Bonferroni-Holm procedure (Holm, 1979),  a main effect for 
Stimulus Type was detected only in the right ACC, F(2,44)= 9.99, p = .0003.  When 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons, a main effect of Stimulus Type was also found in 
the left OFC, F(2,44) = 3.75, p = .031, and a cluster that included the bilateral central 
opercular cortex and insula, F(2,44) = 4.88, p = .012.  Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed 
that activation of the right ACC across both groups was significantly greater for HAI 
outcomes versus monetary outcomes, t(46)= 2.53, p =.015, and social outcomes, t(46) = 
4.05, p = .0002.  Similarly, activation of the left OFC across both groups was 
significantly greater for HAI outcomes versus social outcomes, t(46) = 2.75,  p = .008, 
and monetary outcomes, t(46) = 2.37,  p = .022.  Finally, activation of the bilateral central 
opercular cortex/insula was significantly greater for HAI outcomes relative to social 
outcomes, t(46) = 3.05, p = .004. 
Behavioral Data During fMRI Task 
Each run included four trials in which participants saw the image of a button box.  
Participants were instructed to press a button whenever this image appeared in order to 
measure participants’ attention in this mostly passive task.  A high level of accuracy in 
responding to this image was detected in both the TD group (M = 95.63%, SD = 8.59%) 
and the ASD group (M = 93.50%, SD = 12.15%), t(45) = 0.68, p = .50.  Mean response 
  
	   33	  
times were also similar between groups (ASD: M = 760.14 ms, SD = 155.64 ms; TD: M = 
772.58 ms, SD = 120.00 ms), t(45) = 0.31,  p = .76.  These results suggest that attention 
to the task was somewhat comparable between the ASD and TD groups.  
Beads Task Results 
  A 2 (Uncertainty: High-Uncertainty, Low-Uncertainty) x 2 (Condition: Social, 
Non-Social) x 2 (Group: ASD, TD) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect of 
Condition x Group, F(1, 26) = 4.30, p = 0.048, yet neither the Uncertainty x Condition x 
Group interaction nor the Uncertainty x Group interaction were significant, p > .05 for 
both interactions.  A main effect was also detected for Uncertainty, F(1, 26) = 23.58, p 
< .0001, with both groups choosing significantly more beads in High-Uncertainty 
condition versus the Low-Uncertainty condition.  The main effect of Group was not 
significant, p > .05.  
To further explore the significant Condition x Group interaction, post-hoc t-tests 
were conducted to examine potential between-group differences on each of the four 
versions of the beads tasks (i.e., the High-Uncertainty and Low-Uncertainty social and 
non-social versions).  Across all versions, a significant between-group difference was 
detected only for the Low-Uncertainty non-social version of the beads task, t(20.53) = -
2.43, p = .025, with the ASD group choosing significantly more beads (M = 3.50 , SD = 
2.78) than the TD group (M = 1.67, SD = 1.07).   In addition, within-group t-tests 
revealed that TD children chose significantly more beads in the social Low-Uncertainty 
condition than the non-social Low-Uncertainty condition, t(11) = -2.57, p = .026, while 
no difference was detected between Low-Uncertainty social versus non-social conditions 
in the ASD group, t(15) = -0.37, p = .72 (see Figure 12).   These results may suggest that, 
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while TD children demonstrate behavioral markers of increased IU in social contexts, IU 
may not be influenced by the social nature of the task to the same extent in children with 
ASD.  See Table 13 and Figure 12 for means and standard deviations from each of the 
four conditions for the ASD and TD groups.  
Potential between-group differences were also examined for the proportion of 
participants who “jumped to conclusions” (i.e., only choosing one beads before making a 
final decision) using Chi-square tests.  No differences were detected between groups in 
the percentage of participants using this decision strategy across any of the four task 
conditions, p > .05 for all comparisons.     
Finally, no differences were detected between groups in the self-reported level of 
certainty, distress related to making decisions, confidence about decisions, or the value 
conferred on the decision across all task conditions, p > .05 for all comparisons.  In 
addition, no between-group differences were found in participants’ tendency to choose 
the “correct” jar (i.e., the jar with the most supporting evidence), p >.05 for all 
comparisons.  
Questionnaire Results 
 The ASD and TD groups were compared in terms of their scores on child- and 
parent-report versions of the IUS.  The ASD group scored significantly higher on the 
IUS-P, t(45) = -8.95,  p < .0001, and the IUS-C, t(45) = -3.34, p = .002.  The IUS-P and 
the IUS-C were found to be significantly correlated in the TD group, r(19) = .52, p = .016, 
but not in the ASD group, r(24) = .08, p = .70.   Interestingly, the IUS-P scores were 
significantly higher than the IUS-C scores for the ASD group, t(24) = 2.10, p = 0.046, 
while scores on the IUS-C were significantly higher than the IUS-P in the TD group, 
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t(19) = 2.10,  p = 0.025 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).  Scores on the 
measure of Insistence on Sameness (the Ritualistic/Sameness Behavior subscales of the 
RBS-R) were significantly higher for the ASD group than the TD group, t(45) = 5.81, p 
< .0001  (see Table 1).  The RBS-R scores were also significantly positively correlated 
with IUS-P scores in the ASD group, r(24) = .51, p = .008.  
Exploratory correlations were conducted among IUS and RBS-R scores and 
measures of ASD symptomatology (calibrated severity scores from the ADOS in the 
ASD group and SRS t-scores in both groups) and anxiety (RCADS total anxiety scores 
and SCARED total scores) (see Table 14 for all correlations).  Neither the IUS-C nor the 
IUS-P was correlated with either measure of ASD symptomatology in the ASD or TD 
groups.  However, RBS-R scores were associated with SRS t-scores in the ASD group, 
r(24) = .69, p < .0001.  Correlations were then calculated among IUS and RBS-R scores 
and symptoms of anxiety (RCADS and SCARED total scores).  In the ASD group, the 
IUS-P was correlated with the total RCADS anxiety score, r(24) =  .47, p = .015, and the 
total SCARED score, r(24) =  .79, p < .0001.  The IUS-C was also correlated with the 
total RCADS score in the ASD group, r(24) = 0.39, p = .049, but not with the total 
SCARED score, r(24) = 0.16, p = .43.   Similarly, RBS-R scores were associated with 
both RCADS, r(24) = 0.51, p = .008, and SCARED scores, r(24) = 0.59, p = .002.  In the 
TD group, the IUS-P was associated with the total RCADS score, r(19) =  .54, p = .012, 
and the total SCARED score, r(19) =  .44, p = .046.   The IUS-C scores for the TD group, 
however, were not associated with either the RCADS or SCARED total scores.    
Finally, correlations were conducted among IUS and RBS-R scores and other 
relevant measures (age and full-scale IQ scores) (see Table 2).  In the ASD group, IUS-C 
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scores were associated with age with older children reporting to be more intolerant of 
uncertainty, r(24) = .41, p = .040.  However, the correlations between age and IUS-P 
scores in the ASD group, and age and either IUS-C or IUS-P scores in the TD group were 
not significant, p > .05 for all comparisons.  IUS scores and IQ scores were not correlated 
in the ASD group, p > .05 for all comparisons.  However, in the TD group, IUS-P scores 
were positively correlated with full-scale IQ scores, r(19) = .46, p = .036.   Yet, the 
correlation between IUS-C scores and full-scale IQ scores in the TD group was not 
significant, r(19) = -.12, p = .60.   RBS-R scores were not associated with age or IQ 
scores in either the ASD or TD groups.  
Correlations Among Neural Activation, Behavioral, and Questionnaire Measures 
Exploratory correlations were conducted to investigate potential relationships 
among the magnitude of neural activation during uncertain cues and outcomes and the 
primary dependent variables of the beads task (i.e., the average number of beads/faces 
chosen in the social and non-social conditions), as well as self- and parent-report scores 
on the IUS and RBS-R.  First, correlational analyses examined whether the magnitude of 
brain activation in clusters that differentiated groups for the contrast of uncertain versus 
certain neutral cues were related to IUS and RBS-R scores.  This contrast resulted in ten 
functional ROIs (described above) from which parameter estimates for activation 
magnitudes were derived.  No correlations were found between frontolimbic activation 
during uncertain cues and IUS-C/IUS-P scores in the ASD group.  In the TD group, 
negative correlations were detected between IUS-P scores and activation of the left 
thalamus, r(19) = -.45, p = .040, and between IUS-C scores and activation of the right 
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frontal pole, r(19) = -.44, p = .045.  No significant correlations were found between 
activation magnitudes for uncertain cues and RBS-R scores.   
When correlations were examined between neural activation for uncertain cues 
and performance in the beads task, activation in a cluster that included the right frontal 
operculum cortex and insula in the ASD group was found to be negatively correlated with 
the average number of beads drawn in the non-social condition, r(14) = -.63, p = .009, 
and the average number of faces drawn in the social condition, r(14) = -.51, p = .043.   
Activation of the left putamen was also negatively correlated with the average number of 
beads chosen in the non-social condition for the ASD group, r(14) = -.55, p = . 027.  In 
the TD group, a significant positive correlation was found between the right frontal pole 
and the average number of faces drawn in the social condition, r(10) = .59, p = .043.  
Finally, no significant correlations were found between neural activation for uncertain 
cues and RBS-R scores for either group, p > .05 for all comparisons.  
For the outcome phase, parameter estimates were derived from nine functional 
ROIs (described above) and exploratory correlations were conducted among the 
magnitude of activation in these ROIs during uncertain outcomes and individual 
differences in IUS and RBS-R scores and performance on the beads task.  When 
examining correlations with the IUS scores, a negative correlation was found in the ASD 
group between the activation magnitude of the right caudate nucleus/NAc and IUS-C 
scores, r(24) = -.46, p = .018.  No correlations were found for the IUS-P in the ASD 
group or either version of the IUS in the TD group.  A negative correlation was also 
found between the RBS-R subscale scores and activation magnitude of the right frontal 
pole during uncertain outcomes in the ASD group, r(24) = -.40, p = .043.  No significant 
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correlations were found between neural activation during uncertain outcomes and 
insistence on sameness scores in the TD group.  
For the beads task, a negative correlation was found in the ASD group between 
activation in a cluster that included the right frontal operculum cortex and insula and the 
average number of beads chosen in the non-social condition, r(14) = -.60, p = . 014.  On 
the other hand, positive correlations were found in the TD group between a cluster that 
included the central opercular cortex/insula and the average number of beads in the non-
social conditions, r(10) = .66, p = .019, and average number of faces in the social 
conditions, r(10) = .80, p = .0018.   
DISCUSSION 
The results of the present study provide evidence that children with ASD 
demonstrate atypical neural responsivity to uncertainty across many different contexts, 
including the anticipation and outcome phases of uncertainty, social and non-social 
conditions, and whether measured through an fMRI paradigm, a behavioral measure, or 
self- and parent-report questionnaires.  In addition, we found evidence that the 
differential neural mechanisms for processing uncertainty in ASD may be related to 
behavioral responses to uncertainty and individual differences in symptoms such as IU 
and insistence on sameness.  The more specific results of the study and their implications 
are described below.  
Neural Mechanisms of Uncertain Anticipation 
The first objective of the fMRI component of this study was to understand the 
domain-general neural correlates of uncertainty processing in individuals with and 
without ASD.  We addressed this question by studying between-group differences in 
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neural activation for uncertain cues across different stimulus types.  During the 
presentation of uncertain cues across all stimulus types, the ASD group showed reduced 
activation relative to the TD group in the bilateral thalamus and a cluster in the dorsal 
striatum spanning the right putamen and caudate nucleus, as well as several frontal 
regions (e.g., bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, right middle frontal gyrus, right frontal pole).  
In the Uncertainty x Group interaction across all stimulus types, the ASD group showed 
reduced activation of the right dorsal striatum (putamen/caudate nucleus), right 
OFC/frontal medial cortex, and right precentral gyrus for uncertain versus certain cues.  
Yet, while processing certain neutral cues across all runs, the ASD group showed 
enhanced activation relative to the TD group in the right ventral and dorsal striatal (i.e., 
NAc and caudate nucleus), as well as several right frontal regions (e.g., frontal operculum 
cortex/insula/OFC, paracingulate gyrus, middle frontal gyrus).  
In line with study hypotheses, these results provide evidence for domain-general 
frontolimbic attenuation during the processing of uncertain cues in children with ASD.  
Many of the frontal and striatal regions implicated in the atypical processing of uncertain 
cues have been strongly linked to salience, including the NAc (Carter, MacInnes, Huettel, 
& Adcock, 2009; Haber & McFarland, 1999; Wise, 1996), dorsal striatum (Cooper & 
Knutson, 2008; Zink, Pagnoni, Martin, Dhamala, & Berns, 2003), OFC (Gottfried, 
O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003), insula (Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2002), and 
ACC (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al., 2007).   Further, activation in striatal regions 
in response to salient uncertain stimuli may be influenced by individual differences in 
preference for uncertainty (Sugam, Saddoris, & Carelli, 2014).  It has even been 
suggested that motivation requires either internal or external uncertainty and that 
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motivational salience is determined by the degree of uncertainty present (Anselme, 2010), 
further supporting the inextricable link between motivational salience and uncertainty in 
the TD population.  
Conversely, the results of the current study suggest that certain cues are more 
motivationally salient for children with ASD while uncertain cues tend to be more 
motivationally salient for TD children.  Salience may then impact the extent to which an 
individual recruits cognitive and attentional resources towards processing an event.  
Indeed, TD individuals tend to preserve cognitive resources during predictability (Fiorillo 
et al., 2003; Koch et al., 2008; Schlösser et al., 2009; Volz et al., 2003) and exert greater 
cognitive effort during the anticipation of uncertainty (Mushtaq, Bland, & Schaefer, 
2011).  Our results suggest that the opposite pattern may emerge in ASD with greater 
cognitive resources being devoted to processing certain events.  
A similar pattern of consistently reduced frontolimbic activation in the ASD 
group emerged when examining the between-group differences for uncertain cues in 
different runs.  Specifically, the ASD group demonstrated reduced activation in the right 
thalamus for uncertain cues in the monetary run, in both ventral and dorsal striatum as 
well as several frontal regions (e.g., bilateral frontal pole, left paracingulate gyrus, left 
middle frontal gyrus) for uncertain cues in the HAI run, and in the dorsal striatum (i.e., 
caudate nucleus) and two left frontal clusters (in the inferior frontal gyrus and postcentral 
gyrus) for uncertain cues in the social run.  These results indicate that uncertain cues may 
be less salient for individuals with ASD in both social and non-social conditions, even 
when such cues signify the possibility of circumscribed interest outcomes.  
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In contrast to the findings described above, the results for certain positive cues 
were inconsistent with the study hypotheses, which predicted increased activation during 
certain cues in the ASD group.  For certain monetary cues, the ASD group showed 
attenuated activation of the left thalamus and several frontal regions (e.g., bilateral frontal 
pole, left OFC, right paracingulate/ACC).  For certain HAI cues, the ASD group showed 
reduced activation of the left inferior fontal gyrus, right precentral gyrus, left inferior 
frontal gyrus, and right paracingulate gyrus/ACC.  For certain social cues, no differences 
were found between the ASD and TD groups.  These results suggest that individuals with 
ASD may show atypical activation during cues for non-social stimuli even when 
presented in a 100% certain context.  One explanation for these results may be that, when 
monetary and HAI stimuli are presented under uncertain context, they become less salient 
for individuals with ASD regardless of whether they are preceded by a certain cue.  
Neural Mechanisms of Uncertain Outcomes 
Domain-general mechanisms of uncertainty processing were also examined 
during the outcome phase by comparing neural activation in the ASD and TD group 
during uncertain outcomes.  For uncertain neutral outcomes across runs, the ASD group 
demonstrated reduced activation of the bilateral ACC, right paracingulate gyrus, and a 
cluster spanning left frontal operculum cortex, insula, and OFC.  On the other hand, for 
certain neutral outcomes across runs, the ASD group demonstrated enhanced activation 
of the right caudate nucleus/thalamus.  The results of the Uncertainty x Group interaction 
indicated that the ASD group demonstrated significantly attenuated activation of the left 
central opercular cortex/insula and the left frontal pole relative to the TD group for 
uncertain versus certain neutral outcomes.  Similar to the results from the anticipation 
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phase, this pattern of results provides evidence for a domain-general atypicality in the 
processing of uncertain outcomes in children with ASD.  Given the role of many of these 
frontal and striatal regions in the processing of pleasurable outcomes (Kringelbach & 
Berridge, 2009), these results suggest that individuals with ASD may derive more 
hedonic pleasure from certain versus uncertain outcomes. These findings are consistent 
with evidence that individuals with schizophrenia, a clinical population characterized by 
anhedonia (Germans & Kring, 2000), demonstrate decreased activation of the dorsal 
striatum, ACC, and insula during uncertain outcomes (Koch et al., 2010; Koch et al., 
2011; Morris et al., 2011). 
For uncertain neutral outcomes in individual runs, the ASD group demonstrated 
reduced activation in the left insula/OFC for uncertain neutral outcomes in the monetary 
run and decreased activation of the left caudate nucleus and left superior frontal gyrus 
during the social run.  For uncertain neutral outcomes during the HAI run, the ASD group 
showed a more complex pattern: attenuated activation of the left central opercular 
cortex/insula, right inferior frontal gyrus/OFC, and left superior frontal 
gyrus/paracingulate, and increased activation of the left frontal pole, right precentral 
gyrus, and left superior frontal gyrus.  
It may be important to note that activation during the uncertain neutral outcome 
condition may reflect neural responses to the unexpected omission or loss of a positive 
salient outcome (i.e., a monetary, HAI, or social image), since the uncertain cue 
preceding the neutral image indicated a 50% chance of a monetary, HAI, or social image.  
Accordingly, it is interesting that the ASD group demonstrated increased activation 
relative to the TD group in the HAI run only, since circumscribed interest images are 
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believed to be particularly salient to individuals with ASD (Sasson et al., 2012).  
Increased activation in prefrontal regions during uncertain neutral outcomes in the HAI 
run may suggest that the omission of an HAI image is more salient or that individuals 
with ASD require coping strategies to process the omission of an HAI image as prefrontal 
regions are known to be activated while coping with negative emotions related to 
uncertainty (Herwig, Baumgartner, et al., 2007; Herwig, Kaffenberger, et al., 2007; 
Schienle et al., 2010).  It is also possible that differences between groups in this condition 
reflect differential predictions or expectancy biases about the outcomes of events.  Since 
frontostriatal activity is known to reflect the extent to which an outcome was expected 
(O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003; Rolls, Critchley, Wakeman, & 
Mason, 1996; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), these results may suggest systematic 
differences in predictions during uncertainty or a deficit in building predictive models in 
ASD.  
For uncertain positive outcomes, the ASD group showed attenuated activation of 
the right caudate nucleus during uncertain monetary outcomes and decreased activation 
of the right thalamus and right OFC during uncertain HAI outcomes.  The finding of 
reduced OFC activation during uncertain HAI outcomes is worth noting given previous 
evidence for increased OFC activation during HAI outcomes (Dichter, Felder, et al., 
2012).   Given the role of the OFC in experienced pleasure (Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, 
& Rangel, 2008),  this result may suggest that HAI outcomes in a maximal uncertain 
condition as in the present study may not be experienced as pleasurable for individuals 
with ASD.   
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However, for uncertain social outcomes, the ASD group demonstrated increased 
activation of the right middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus.  This finding 
may reflect the tendency of individuals with ASD to view some social stimuli as aversive 
(Corona, Dissanayake, Arbelle, Wellington, & Sigman, 1998; Dalton et al., 2005).  
Therefore, when presented with a social outcome following an uncertain cue (rather than 
a neutral image), individuals with ASD may show significantly greater activation in 
frontal regions involved in coping with negative feelings related to uncertainty (Herwig, 
Baumgartner, et al., 2007).  Another explanation may be that the social deficits in ASD 
make social stimuli seem even more uncertain.  In this case, a face with a happy 
expression may seem more ambiguous or unclear in terms of the extent to which it 
predicts future behavior.  Therefore increased perceived uncertainty relative to the TD 
group may result in greater activation of frontal regions associated with uncertainty 
processing.  
Similar to the results for certain positive cues, the between-group differences for 
certain positive outcomes ran counter to the study hypotheses, which predicted that the 
ASD group would show increased frontolimbic activation for certain outcomes.  
Conversely, the ASD group demonstrated decreased activation of several frontal regions 
(bilateral paracingulate gyrus, bilateral frontal pole, and left superior frontal gyrus) 
during monetary outcomes and decreased activation of the bilateral frontal pole during 
certain social outcomes.  However, for certain HAI outcomes, the ASD group 
demonstrated reduced activation of the left middle frontal gyrus and increased activation 
of the left ACC.  These results may indicate that individuals with ASD show atypical 
processing of social and non-social stimuli even in a certain context.  The one exception 
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to this pattern was the finding of increased ACC activation for certain HAI outcomes.  
This result may reflect the salience of these images for individuals with ASD, given the 
role of the ACC in detecting salient stimuli (Seeley et al., 2007).  
Although the results for both certain positive outcomes and certain positive cues 
in the present study indicated attenuated activation of some frontal regions, it is important 
to note that no differences in striatal activation during certain positive cues or outcomes 
were found between the ASD and TD groups.  On the other hand, between-group 
differences were found in striatal regions for domain-general uncertain cues and 
outcomes, uncertain HAI and social cues, and uncertain monetary and neutral outcomes 
in the present study.  Therefore, while children with ASD recruit atypical neural 
mechanisms for both certain and uncertain cues and outcomes, differences in striatal 
responses may be found only in uncertain contexts.  This distinction is notable 
considering the unique role of the striatum in motivational salience and learning 
associations between cues and outcomes (Berridge & Robinson, 2003).  
When activation was compared among the three possible outcome types (i.e., 
monetary, HAI, and social outcomes), both groups showed significantly greater 
activation in the right ACC and left OFC for HAI outcomes relative to social and 
monetary outcomes, and in the bilateral central opercular cortex/insula for HAI outcomes 
relative to social outcomes.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
individuals with ASD would show significantly greater frontolimbic activation for non-
social versus social outcomes.   
Behavioral Measure of Responses to Uncertainty 
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 In the beads task, both the TD and ASD groups chose significantly more 
beads/faces during the high-uncertainty versus the low-uncertainty condition, suggesting 
that participants with and without ASD recognized the need to gather more information 
in the context of a more ambiguous task.  Across the four different versions of the task, 
the only between-group difference was found in the non-social low-uncertainty condition 
with individuals with ASD choosing to draw more beads than the TD group.  
Interestingly, the TD group chose to view significantly more faces in the social low-
uncertainty condition than the non-social low-uncertainty condition, while the ASD 
group did not modify their performance based on the social nature of the task.  This 
pattern of findings may suggest that both TD children and children with ASD are likely 
to seek out more information in highly uncertain situations.  However, in situations that 
are less ambiguous, TD children can tolerate a greater degree of uncertainty particularly 
in non-social conditions, while children with ASD may seek out information to reduce 
uncertainty regardless of the context.  
 These results are consistent with previous research indicating that adolescents 
with ASD chose more beads than TD adolescents in a non-social version of the task 
(Brosnan et al., 2014).  However, it may also be important to note that another study 
involving an adult sample found that the ASD group chose fewer beads than the control 
group (Jänsch & Hare, 2014), suggesting that adults with ASD may use a “jumping to 
conclusions” approach (i.e., choosing only one or two beads before making a decision) as 
a coping strategy for avoiding the experience of uncertainty.  
Contrary to our hypotheses, no differences were found between the ASD and TD 
groups for the social condition.  However, previous research using the social version of 
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the beads task in a sample with eating disorders (i.e., anorexia and bulimia) also found no 
differences between groups (Sternheim et al., 2011), despite impaired social skills 
(Grisset & Norvell, 1992; Russell, Schmidt, Doherty, Young, & Tchanturia, 2009) and 
elevated IU in this population (Konstantellou & Reynolds, 2010; Sternheim et al., 2011).  
Yet, given high levels of social anxiety in both of these clinical populations (Kuusikko et 
al., 2008; Levinson & Rodebaugh, 2012),  it is possible that the results of both the ASD 
and eating disorder groups may have been influenced by a drive to avoid seeing faces, 
which may have countered the drive to seek more information due to IU in these contexts.  
However, it is important to note that these results should be interpreted with caution 
given the small sample size of participants that completed this task and confounding 
factors that may have influenced performance, such as impaired executive functioning 
(Hill, 2004) or different decision-making strategies in ASD (De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, 
Bird, & Dolan, 2008). 
Questionnaire Measures of Responses to Uncertainty 
The present study also examined relationships among reported levels of IU, 
insistence on sameness, and other clinical symptomatology.  First, we found that the IUS-
P and IUS-C were positively correlated in the TD group, yet were not significantly 
correlated in the ASD group.  This finding is not exceedingly surprising as previous 
research in TD children and children with anxiety disorders has also failed to find a 
significant correlation between the IUS-C and IUS-P (Comer et al., 2009).  Based on 
these previous results, Comer and colleagues (2009) have suggested that the child-report 
may be a more valid measure of this construct in TD children and children with anxiety 
disorders, since the IUS-C was more effective in discriminating children with anxiety 
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disorders from those without anxiety disorders and more robustly correlated with anxiety, 
worry, and reassurance-seeking than the IUS-P.    
In the present study, IUS-P scores were significantly higher than IUS-C scores in 
the ASD group, while the opposite pattern was found in the TD group.  Given that 
children with ASD have been found to under-report symptoms to some extent (Johnson, 
Filliter, & Murphy, 2009), these results may suggest that the IUS-P is a more valid 
measure of IU in ASD than the IUS-C.  Indeed, previous research suggests that the IUS-P 
may be more effective in discriminating ASD versus TD groups than the IUS-C (Boulter 
et al., 2013).   In addition, the current study found that IUS-C scores in the ASD were 
positively correlated with age while IUS-P scores were not correlated with age.  While 
these results may reflect a pattern of increasing IU over the adolescent years [as observed 
in TD samples (Tymula et al., 2012)], they may also suggest that insight about IU 
improves with age in children with ASD.   
As expected, individuals with ASD were reported to be more intolerant of 
uncertainty on both the IUS-P and IUS-C and showed increased levels of insistence on 
sameness on the Ritualized/Sameness subscales of the RBS-R.  These results further 
support the fMRI and behavioral findings of atypical responding to uncertainty in ASD.  
However, it is interesting to note that individual differences in IU were not correlated 
with ASD symptomatology in either the ASD or TD groups, while insistence on 
sameness severity was significantly correlated with ASD symptomatology (as indexed by 
the SRS) in the ASD group.  These results suggest some functional differentiation 
between the constructs of IU and insistence on sameness in ASD with the latter being 
more closely related to ASD symptomatology.  However, it may be important to note that 
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two of sixty-five items on the SRS were designed to measure insistence on sameness 
symptoms (i.e., “When under stress, he or she shows rigid or inflexible patterns of 
behavior that seem odd” and “Has more difficulty than other children with changes in his 
or her routine”) (Constantino et al., 2003).   In addition, the IUS was designed to index 
IU as expressed in GAD (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998) and therefore this measure 
may not index aversion towards uncertainty in ASD to the same extent.  
 However, both IU and insistence on sameness were correlated with anxiety 
symptoms in the ASD group.  These results are consistent with previous evidence for 
strong positive correlations between anxiety and IU (Boulter et al., 2013; Chamberlain et 
al., 2013; Wigham et al., 2014) and between anxiety and insistence on sameness (Gotham 
et al., 2013; Rodgers et al., 2012).  In a recent study, Boulter and colleagues (2013) found 
evidence that IU mediates the relationship between anxiety and ASD, suggesting that IU 
may play a casual role in the development of anxiety in ASD.  According to this model, 
insistence on sameness in ASD may serve as a maladaptive coping strategy aimed at 
reducing uncertainty, rather than a core symptom of ASD.  Although the present study 
does not provide evidence to support or refute insistence on sameness as a coping 
strategy for IU, it further supports the role of both constructs in anxiety symptoms 
associated with ASD.  
Relations Among Neural, Behavioral, and Questionnaire Measures of Uncertainty 
Correlational analyses revealed that behavioral and questionnaire measures of 
responses to uncertainty were associated with neural activation during uncertainty 
processing in both the ASD and TD group.  In the ASD group, reduced activation of the 
left putamen and of a cluster including the right frontal operculum cortex, insula, and 
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OFC during uncertain cues and reduced activation in a cluster that included the frontal 
operculum cortex, insula, and frontal medial cortex during uncertain outcomes were 
associated with a greater number of beads/faces drawn before making a decision (i.e., 
behavior suggesting elevated IU).  In the TD group, the opposite pattern was found with 
increased activation of the right frontal pole during uncertain cues and increased 
activation of the central opercular cortex/insula during uncertain outcomes being 
associated with a greater number of beads/faces drawn. 
These results indicate that individuals with ASD who showed more attenuated 
activation of frontal and striatal regions during uncertainty processing were more likely to 
be intolerant of uncertainty in the beads task and, conversely, the TD individuals who 
showed greater frontal activation were more intolerant of uncertainty in the beads task.  
Most importantly, these findings demonstrate that different mechanisms may underlie 
behavioral responses to uncertainty in children with ASD versus TD children.  The 
positive relationship between IU and frontal activation in the TD group is consistent with 
previous research in TD individuals and individuals with anxiety disorders (Krain et al., 
2008; Levy et al., 2010; Simmons et al., 2008).  The negative relationship between IU 
and frontostriatal activation in the ASD group suggests that different neural mechanisms, 
namely attenuated frontostriatal activation during uncertainty processing, may contribute 
to elevated IU and behavioral avoidance of uncertainty in individuals with ASD.   
 Further supporting this differentiation, negative correlations were found between 
the magnitude of activation in the right caudate nucleus/NAc during uncertain outcomes 
and IUS-C scores and between right frontal pole activation and insistence on sameness 
scores in the ASD group.  These correlations indicate that higher levels of IU and 
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insistence on sameness were associated with reduced frontostriatal activation.  This 
finding also suggests that attenuated frontostriatal activation (rather than increased 
activation as in TD and anxiety disorder samples) contributes to a preference for certainty 
and aversion towards uncertainty in ASD.  In addition, given that the ventral and dorsal 
striatum are critical in motivational salience (Berridge, 2004), these results suggest that 
children with ASD who are more intolerant of uncertainty are less likely to find uncertain 
outcomes motivationally salient.    
Salience of Social and Non-Social Stimuli in ASD 
The current results may shed light on why individuals with ASD are biased to 
prefer more certain, predictable stimuli (such as circumscribed interests) rather more 
dynamic, unpredictable stimuli (such as social cues).  Reduced activation of the striatum, 
insula, OFC, and ACC during uncertainty processing in the ASD group suggests that 
uncertain cues and outcomes are less salient for individuals with ASD, as these regions 
comprise the “salience network” (Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al., 2007; Zink et al., 
2003).  The salience network is critical in recognizing significant events in the 
environment and re-directing attentional and cognitive resources towards the processing 
of these events (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008).  In TD samples, the salience 
network is reliably activated by novel or uncertain events (Horvitz, 2000; Joshua, Adler, 
& Bergman, 2010).  Reduced activation of the salience network during uncertainty, as in 
the present study, may result in a child who disengages from uncertain social stimuli and 
becomes more motivated to approach predictable non-social stimuli such as objects 
related to circumscribed interests. 
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In the present study, both groups demonstrated significantly greater frontostriatal 
activation for non-social stimuli (i.e., money and HAI stimuli) versus social stimuli 
during uncertain cues and outcomes.  These results are consistent with reports that 
individuals with ASD find circumscribed interest images more salient than social images 
(Sasson et al., 2012) and orient to circumscribed interest images more frequently than 
social images (Sasson et al., 2011).  Further, nearly all individuals with ASD report 
increased motivation for specific non-social circumscribed interests (Klin et al., 2007) 
and these interests are often pursued to the extent that they interfere with social 
relationships and functional activities (Turner-Brown et al., 2011).  
Implications for Theoretical Models of ASD 
These results address two recent theoretical models suggesting that a core deficit 
in ASD may be related to how individuals with ASD process uncertain events and 
develop predictions based on these events.  The first model, proposed by Sinha and 
colleagues (2014), suggests that individuals with ASD have an impaired ability to 
understand predictive relationships in the environment.  According to this model, an 
inability to effectively develop and test predictive hypotheses results in individuals with 
ASD living in a constantly unpredictable and uncertain environment.  Insistence on 
sameness and avoidance of social interaction thus minimizes the impact of this deficit.   
A second theoretical model, developed by Van de Cruys and colleagues (2014), 
builds upon the first model by suggesting that impaired predictive coding in ASD is the 
result of an inability to learn from relevant predictive cues in a dynamic and uncertain 
environment.  According to this model, individuals with ASD are overly attuned to 
uncertainty in the environment as they expect every situation to meet very precise 
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predictions based on past events.  Thus, they place too much weight on irrelevant 
violations of their expectations and predictive coding becomes shaped by environmental 
noise or random variability rather than relevant cues.  The authors suggest that this effect 
is particularly robust in complex and dynamic situations such as social interactions.  
Accordingly, individuals with ASD may prefer to engage in repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviors with known contingencies, while avoiding the relative uncertainty of social 
interactions.  
These models each present testable hypotheses for the neurobiological responses 
to uncertainty in ASD.  In the first model, Sinha and colleagues (2014) hypothesized that 
individuals with ASD would show hyperactivity of the striatum since impaired predictive 
coding would make uncertain outcomes seem novel and the striatum is known to be 
sensitive to novelty (Joshua et al., 2010).  Van de Cruys and colleagues (2014) 
hypothesized that individuals with ASD would show greater ACC and insula activation 
during uncertain outcomes as these regions respond to salient events such as violations of 
predictions (Ham, Leff, de Boissezon, Joffe, & Sharp, 2013; Limongi, Sutherland, Zhu, 
Young, & Habib, 2013).  
The results of the current study clearly contradict these models, finding instead 
hypoactivation of the ACC, insula, and striatum for uncertain outcomes.  These results 
suggest that individuals with ASD may find uncertain outcomes less salient, thus making 
them less likely to exert the effort to build predictive models for uncertainty.  
Alternatively, individuals with ASD in early development may have difficulty judging 
relevant versus irrelevant predictive cues and, thus to avoid living in a constant state of 
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uncertainty, begin to gradually ignore or avoid processing uncertain events, attending 
instead to certain and predictable events.  
Uncertainty and Learning in ASD 
Frontostriatal hyporesponsivity to uncertain cues and outcomes may also explain 
the atypical learning processing observed in ASD (Dawson, Mottron, & Gernsbacher, 
2008).  In typical development, unexpected events reliably draw the attention of infants 
as young as two months of age, as the ability to attend to and process uncertainty is 
extremely important for learning (Baillargeon, 2004).  Unexpected events cue individuals 
to the limitations of their own knowledge and thus prompt increased frontostriatal 
activation as the brain attempts to build predictive models to understand the event 
(McClure, Daw, & Read Montague, 2003; Niv, Duff, & Dayan, 2005; Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000).  In other words, learning occurs when there is a mismatch between the 
expected event and the actual event.  This mismatch is referred to as a “prediction error” 
(Hikosaka, Nakamura, & Nakahara, 2006; McClure, Daw, et al., 2003; Schultz, Dayan, & 
Montague, 1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; Seymour et al., 2004).  Prediction errors 
result in differential firing of dopaminergic neurons and thus alter activity of the 
frontostriatal network, as predictive models are updated to reflect the unexpected event.  
Predictions made in a more uncertain environment (e.g., with a greater number of 
unreliable or irrelevant cues) are more likely to result in larger prediction errors and thus 
enhanced learning (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Preuschoff & 
Bossaerts, 2007; Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008). 
This learning process has been previously associated with many of the regions 
showing attenuated activation in the ASD group for the present study, including the 
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striatum (Delgado et al., 2005; Pagnoni, Zink, Montague, & Berns, 2002; Seymour et al., 
2004), insula (Preuschoff et al., 2008), inferior frontal gyrus (Delgado et al., 2005), and 
OFC (O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rolls et al., 1996; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000).  Similarly, 
individuals with schizophrenia, who have significant deficits in associative learning 
(Jensen et al., 2007; Waltz, Frank, Robinson, & Gold, 2007), have demonstrated reduced 
striatal activation during both positive and negative prediction errors (Morris et al., 2012).  
Accordingly, children with ASD may be less attuned to prediction errors in their 
environment and thus less likely to learn in uncertain contexts.  If children with ASD are 
not learning from unexpected events to the same extent as TD children, it is not 
surprising that they prefer to engage in repetitive behaviors and rituals, prefer sameness 
in their environment, and focus on narrow and specialized interests.  This atypicality may 
also explain why children with ASD, despite an intact ability to recognize novelty, tend 
to be less responsive to novel stimuli (Courchesne et al., 1984; Courchesne et al., 1985) 
and do not explore novel objects to the same extent as TD children (Pierce & Courchesne, 
2001; Sasson et al., 2008).   Learning from uncertain contexts also allows an individual to 
update goals in light of unexpected information and therefore is critical to the 
development of flexible behavior (Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 1999; Braver & Cohen, 
1999).  Accordingly, atypical activation of frontostriatal regions during uncertainty may 
provide one possible explanation why individuals with ASD show reduced cognitive and 
behavioral flexibility.  
Uncertainty Processing in ASD versus Other Clinical Populations 
The present results also provide some insight into the processing of uncertainty in 
ASD versus other clinical populations.  McEvoy and Mahoney (2011) recently suggested 
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that IU may be a “transdiagnostic mechanism” (pg. 533) across several disorders and 
encouraged the “development of a transdiagnostic treatment protocol” (pg. 543) that 
involves efforts to reduce IU across different clinical populations.  However, the present 
results suggest that the mechanisms underlying IU may be different in ASD versus other 
clinical populations and thus intervention approaches may need to be adapted to reflect 
these differences.    
A consistent pattern of increased activation in frontolimbic brain regions during 
uncertain conditions has been detected across different populations associated with 
elevated anxiety, including experimentally induced anxiety or high trait anxiety (Herry et 
al., 2007; Paulus, Feinstein, Simmons, & Stein, 2004), adolescents with anxiety disorders 
and high levels of IU (Krain et al., 2008), and adults with generalized anxiety disorder 
(Yassa et al., 2012).  In addition, activation of frontolimbic regions is positively 
correlated with reported levels of IU in anxiety disorders (Krain et al., 2008).  These 
findings suggest that, even across distinct anxiety disorders, the atypicality in uncertainty 
processing may be mechanistically similar.  
Yet, a different pattern of atypicality emerges when examining uncertainty 
processing in schizophrenia.  Although many of the same brain regions are implicated, 
individuals with schizophrenia have shown a pattern of attenuated responses in 
frontolimbic regions (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus, ACC, dorsal striatum) during uncertain 
conditions and increased activation in the striatum during certain conditions (Koch et al., 
2010; Koch et al., 2011; Krug et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2011).  This pattern of results 
suggests that, although both individuals with anxiety and schizophrenia respond 
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atypically to uncertainty, uncertain cues and events may be more salient for individuals 
with anxiety disorders and less salient for individuals with schizophrenia.  
The results of the present study consistently indicated decreased frontolimbic 
activation during uncertain cues and outcomes and negative correlations between 
frontolimbic activation and behavioral responses to uncertainty in ASD.  Accordingly, 
the neural mechanisms of uncertainty processing in ASD may resemble those associated 
with schizophrenia to a greater extent than anxiety disorders.  This finding is notable in 
light of the significant correlations between anxiety, IU, and insistence on sameness in 
the present ASD sample and, more generally, the high rate of comorbid anxiety in ASD 
(White, Oswald, Ollendick, & Scahill, 2009).  However, it is important to note that, 
although the current results suggest differentiation between uncertainty responding in 
ASD and anxiety disorders, children with ASD were not directly compared to a matched 
group of children with anxiety disorders; thus future work is warranted to clarify the 
differences between these clinical populations.   
In addition, IU in anxiety disorders involves the belief that uncertainty typically 
results in a negative outcome (Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). Thus IU 
is rarely studied in anxiety disorders in the context of positively valenced outcomes.  
However, one previous study that did include only positively valenced outcomes found 
no significant differences in neural activation between the anxiety and control groups for 
the uncertain condition (Stern et al., 2012).  The results of the current study suggest that 
atypical processing of uncertainty may occur even in the context of highly preferred 
objects (i.e., circumscribed interests) in ASD.  Thus, an unexpected positive event such as 
winning the lottery or arriving at a surprise party, may not be difficult for an individual 
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with anxiety to process or tolerate, while these events may still be difficult for individuals 
with ASD.  
Insistence on Sameness and IU 
These results may also help to distinguish IU from insistence on sameness in ASD 
to some extent, as they suggest that IU and insistence on sameness, although correlated, 
may index somewhat different constructs in ASD.  Both IU and insistence on sameness 
severity in the present study were highly associated with anxiety symptoms in the ASD 
group, yet only the insistence on sameness scores were associated with ASD 
symptomatology.  In addition, while IU scores were associated with both frontal and 
limbic activation during uncertain cues and outcomes, insistence on sameness was 
associated with only one cluster in the right frontal pole during uncertain outcomes.  
Some of the different results for IU and insistence on sameness in the present 
study are undoubtedly related to how these constructs were measured.  The IUS (which is 
currently the only well-validated measure of IU) was designed to measure IU in 
generalized anxiety disorder and thus measures some aspects of uncertainty aversion that 
are unlikely to be present in ASD, such those related to social comparisons (e.g., “I think 
it’s unfair that other people seem so sure of their future” and “Unlike me, others always 
seem to know where they are going with their lives”).  Similarly, some of the items on 
the RBS-R subscales used to measure insistence on sameness may reflect the social and 
communication deficits associated with ASD (e.g., repeating the same topics of 
conversation, insisting that others do certain things during play/leisure activities).   
By definition, IU indicates an aversion towards uncertainty, while insistence on 
sameness is defined as a preference for predictability, routine, or behavioral rituals (APA, 
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2013; Freeston et al., 1994).  Thus IU may involve withdrawal-related motivation to 
avoid or minimize uncertainty, while insistence on sameness seems to imply approach-
related processes to seek out or create certainty in the environment.  Indeed, over 85% of 
IUS items involve withdrawal-related responses to uncertainty while less than 15% of 
IUS items involved approach-related preference for certainty.  Conversely, the RBS-R 
subscales include about 24% withdrawal-related items and 76% approach-related items.   
Interestingly, there is some evidence that approach-related processes are 
associated with greater left prefrontal activation, while withdrawal processes are related 
to greater right prefrontal activation (Heller, Nitschke, & Miller, 1998; Sutton & 
Davidson, 1997).  In the current study, the TD group showed significantly greater 
activation of the right prefrontal cortex than the ASD group for uncertain versus certain 
cues, suggesting a tendency to withdraw from uncertain cues.  For the contrast of certain 
versus uncertain outcomes, the ASD group showed significantly greater activation of the 
left prefrontal cortex, suggesting a tendency to approach certain outcomes.  However, it is 
important to note that these hemispheric differences in approach/withdrawal tendencies 
have been mostly studied using electrophysiological rather than fMRI studies and 
evidence supporting the detection of such hemispheric differences in fMRI studies is 
inconsistent (Tomarken & Zald, 2009; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003).  
Implications for ASD Interventions 
A better understanding of the role of uncertainty processing in ASD may have 
important implications for identifying the active ingredients in effective behavioral 
interventions for ASD.  Many empirically validated interventions for ASD are designed 
increase predictability and minimize uncertainty.  For example, Applied Behavior 
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Analysis (ABA) teaches new skills through predictable delivery of explicit rewards 
(Jensen & Sinclair, 2002; Koegel, Koegel, Harrower, & Carter, 1999; Krasny, Williams, 
Provencal, & Ozonoff, 2003; Lovaas, Schreibman, & Koegel, 1974; Strain, Kerr, & 
Ragland, 1979).  The Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related Communication-
Handicapped Children (TEACCH) model reduces uncertainty in the environment through 
physical structuring and visual cues (Mesibov & Shea, 2010; Mesibov, Shea, & Schopler, 
2004).   In addition, many interventions for children with ASD utilize circumscribed 
interests (i.e., more familiar and predictable stimuli), as this approach has been found to 
increase motivation in children with ASD and ultimately improve their behavior (Boyd, 
Conroy, Mancil, Nakao, & Alter, 2007; Charlop & Haymes, 1996).  Presumably these 
intervention programs strive to make the environment more certain and predictable in 
order to successfully scaffold the learning of complex skills, particularly in social and 
communication domains.   
Yet, even with this scaffolding, more recent research suggests that there is 
significant heterogeneity within the ASD group in responses to such interventions (Kasari, 
2002; Sherer & Schreibman, 2005; Spreckley & Boyd, 2009).  This heterogeneity in 
treatment response raises the possibility that individual differences in processing 
uncertainty might influence the effectiveness of these interventions—with some 
individuals with ASD requiring greater predictability in order to benefit maximally from 
such interventions.  In line with this idea, the present study found that individuals with 
ASD with higher levels of IU demonstrated different neural responses to uncertainty than 
individuals with lower levels of IU.  Future research should examine how individual 
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differences in responses to uncertainty might influence responses to different degrees of 
predictability in an intervention approach.  
The study of uncertainty processing in ASD may also inform the development of 
early intervention programs.  If the uncertainty of social stimuli decreases their 
motivational salience, infants and toddlers at risk for ASD may choose to avoid or ignore 
social stimuli more and more over the course of development, ultimately resulting in 
greater social and communicative impairments later in life.  Consequently, early 
intervention programs that increase the predictability and consistency of social stimuli 
may help to prevent children from following this aberrant developmental trajectory.  
Indeed, one of the most promising early intervention programs for infants and toddlers at 
risk for ASD involves naturalistic social reinforcement delivered in a predictable, 
structured interaction (Dawson et al., 2010).    
Interventions for ASD may also incorporate a component that directly addresses 
the elevated levels of IU in this population.  Dugas and Ladouceur (2000) designed a 
treatment model that effectively reduces IU in individuals with anxiety disorders. This 
treatment model results in decreased levels of IU and subsequently decreased symptoms 
of anxiety and depression, and even improved adaptive functioning (Dugas et al., 2003; 
Ladouceur, Dugas, et al., 2000; Leger, Ladouceur, Dugas, & Freeston, 2003).  However, 
since IU may involve different neural mechanisms in ASD, it is unclear whether such an 
intervention would be effective in an ASD population.   
Future research might also examine the extent to which atypical neural responses 
to uncertainty may be altered by psychotropic medication.  As in the present study, 
activation of prefrontal regions during uncertain outcomes is reduced in schizophrenia 
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relative to controls  (Koch et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2011).  Atypical prefrontal responses 
to uncertainty in schizophrenia, however, may be remediated to some extent by 
antipsychotic medication.  Paulus and colleagues (2002) found that antipsychotic 
medication enhances prefrontal activation during uncertainty processing, suggesting that 
antipsychotic medication may help individuals with schizophrenia to process uncertainty 
in a more typical way.   
Limitations 
An important limitation of this study was the passive nature of the task, which 
resulted in limited behavioral data to aid in the interpretation of the fMRI results and may 
have reduced participants’ attention to the task.  However, a passive task was chosen 
because an active task (particularly one which adapts to participants’ performance) is 
likely to decrease the subjective experience of uncertainty as participants would perceive 
themselves to be more “in control” of the task.   
Another possible limitation is that frontolimbic circuitry is known to undergo 
significant functional changes during adolescence (Bjork et al., 2004; Galvan et al., 2006; 
Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010).  Since our sample included participants from 9 to 18 years, 
it is possible that the heterogeneity of frontolimbic responses in the present sample 
obscured some of the results.  In addition, adolescents may be more intolerant of 
uncertainty than adults (Tymula et al., 2012).  Therefore, future research is needed to 
address whether these results generalize to younger children or adults with ASD.     
The questionnaire measures of IU and insistence on sameness were also limited in 
the extent to which they could capture these constructs in ASD and TD populations.  As 
mentioned before, the IUS may be biased to index IU as expressed in anxiety disorders
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(Steketee et al., 1998).  The RBS-R, on the other hand, is a measure designed to measure 
insistence on sameness in ASD and the variability of scores on this measure for TD 
participants was extremely low.    
Finally, it is possible that the ASD and TD groups differed systematically in their 
expectancy biases during uncertainty and different expectancy biases are known to 
influence frontolimbic activation (O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rolls et al., 1996; Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000).  Because we did not collect online reports of expectations during the 
anticipation period, we do not know whether individuals with ASD were expecting a 
neutral or non-neutral image, the same image as the previous uncertain trial, or had no 
expectations at all.  Future research should include online monitoring of predictions 
during the processing of uncertainty in ASD.  
Future Directions and Conclusions 
As the present study is the first investigation of the neural mechanisms of 
uncertainty processing in ASD, future work is clearly needed in order to replicate and 
expand upon these findings.  First, it will be important to clarify the extent to which 
individuals with ASD show atypical responses to different types of uncertainty (e.g., 
probabilistic versus temporal uncertainty, uncertainty about the relationship between 
stimulus and outcome versus uncertainty due to sensory misperception, expected versus 
unexpected uncertainty).  Future work should also study the specific neurobiological 
correlates of an aversion towards uncertainty versus a preference for sameness, order, or 
familiarity in ASD.  Another important question for future research is the developmental 
course of uncertainty processing in ASD and how this influences the bidirectional 
relationship between atypical responding to uncertainty and associated symptoms of ASD.  
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Future research should also specifically examine the role of uncertainty in learning 
processes for children with ASD and seek to understand how this might influence 
intervention approaches in this population.  Finally, it will be important for future work to 
directly compare uncertainty processing in ASD to other clinical populations.  A better 
understanding of these differences will inform the extent to which existing or novel 
interventions for IU can be applied across diagnostically distinct populations.  
The present study provides empirical evidence for atypical responding to 
uncertainty across many contexts in children with ASD and demonstrates that the neural 
mechanisms underlying uncertainty processing are different in children with ASD when 
compared to TD children.  The specific brain activation patterns detected in response to 
uncertain cues and outcomes in the present study suggests that children with ASD may 
find uncertain cues and outcomes less salient and thus devote fewer cognitive resources 
towards processing these events.  The present results may have implications for 
understanding elevated levels of IU and insistence on sameness in ASD.  More broadly, 
these findings may shed light on many different aspects of ASD including learning 
atypicalities, the presence of intense circumscribed interests, and impaired social 
motivation and attention.  Ultimately, a better understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying uncertainty processing in ASD may help to differentiate ASD from other 
clinical populations, as well as inform the development of interventions that effectively 
address and remediate atypical processing of uncertainty in ASD.   
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Table 1 
 
Participant characteristics 
 
 
Note.  IQ = intelligence quotient estimated from the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 
(KBIT).  IUS-P = Intolerance of Uncertainty- Parent version. IUS-C = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale- Child Version. RBS-R subscales = Repetitive Behavior Scale- 
Revised Ritualized/Sameness Behavior subscale.  SRS = Social Responsiveness Scale. 
ADOS = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule. RCADS = Revised Children’s 
Anxiety and Depression Scale. SCARED = Screen for Child Anxiety-Related Emotional 
Disorders.  
 ASD (n= 26) TD (n= 21) p 
Age 14.08 (3.15) 13.43 (2.69) .46 
Full Scale IQ 105.69 (17.47) 112.89 (14.86) .15 
Verbal IQ 105.08 (17.29) 110.79 (14.54) .24 
Non-Verbal IQ 104.42 (15.37) 111.11 (13.61) .14 
Absolute head motion 0.05 (0.07) 0.03 (0.03) .20 
Race/ethnicity 23 Caucasian, 3 African Americans 
16 Caucasian, 5 African 
Americans .47 
Gender 24 males, 2 females, 19 males, 2 females .82 
IUS-P 79.73 (12.61) 44.62 (14.26) < .001 
IUS-C 70.23 (20.13) 52.14 (14.62) .001 
RBS-R subscales 0.16 (0.38) 13.77 (10.57) < .001 
SRS t-score 74.84 (9.05 58.47 (3.34) <.001 
ADOS severity Score 8.3 (1.52) N/A N/A 
RCADS total score 72.00 (10.31) 60.91 (8.83) < .001 
SCARED total score 23.56 (11.68) 6.65 (5.94) < .001 
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 Table 2 
 
Between-group differences for uncertain cues across all runs 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region 
 
Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
TD>ASD       
   Frontal pole Right 95 2.94 40 52 14 
   Inferior frontal gyrus  Left 163 3.21 -52 20 22 
   Inferior frontal gyrus Right 357 3.35 52 20 24 
   Juxtapositional lobule cortex Left 111 3.06 -4 -12 68 
   Middle frontal gyrus Right 67 2.76 38 14 50 
   Postcentral gyrus Left 132 3.21 -12 -38 72 
   Precentral gyrus Right 41 2.80 48 -8 44 
   Putamen/Caudate nucleus Right 47 3.28 22 2 4 
   Thalamus Left 122 3.02 -12 -22 2 
   Thalamus Right 107 2.98 16 -24 2 
ASD>TD       
   None       
 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  
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Table 3 
 
Uncertainty x group interaction in the anticipation phase 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region 
 
Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
   OFC/ Frontal medial cortex Right 52 3.58 18 34 -18 
   Precentral gyrus Right 70 3.06 -2 -22 72 
   Putamen/Caudate nucleus Right 72 3.02 24 18 -2 
 
Note.  All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space.  All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05). OFC = orbital frontal cortex.  
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Table 4 
 
Between-group differences for certain neutral cues across all runs 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region 
 
Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
TD>ASD       
   None       
ASD>TD       
   Frontal operculum cortex/Insula/OFC Right 148 5.77 36 22 6 
   Frontal pole Right 129 3.23 44 36 12 
   NAc/Caudate nucleus Right 84 6.21 8 16 -2 
   Middle frontal gyrus Right 45 3.90 38 24 52 
   Paracingulate gyrus Right 85 2.97 2 24 38 
   Superior frontal gyrus Right 66 3.03 4 32 56 
 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05). OFC = orbital frontal cortex.  NAc = nucleus 
accumbens.  
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Table 5 
 
Between-group differences for uncertain positive cues 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
Monetary: TD>ASD       
   Thalamus Right 53 3.15 10 -24 0 
Monetary: ASD>TD       
     None       
HAI: TD>ASD       
   Caudate nucleus/NAc Left 71 4.94 -16 18 -6 
   Frontal polea Left 79 3.03 -34 52 8 
   Frontal pole Right 53 2.81 34 58 14 
   Middle frontal gyrus Left 124 2.79 -38 4 50 
   Paracingulate Gyrus Left 57 3.43 -4 16 52 
   Precentral Gyrus Left 11 2.81 -38 -6 56 
   Precentral Gyrus Right 118 3.37 48 6 26 
   Putamen/Caudate nucleus Right 64 3.14 20 6 6 
HAI: ASD>TD       
   None       
Social: TD>ASD       
   Caudate nucleus Right 44 4.91 12 -4 16 
   Inferior frontal gyrus  Left 53 3.15 -58 26 2 
   Postcentral gyrus Left 65 2.96 -6 -38 74 
Social: ASD>TD       
   None       
 
Note. aTwo clusters within same region, coordinates and peak activation reported for 
highest peak activation. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are 
significant at Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05). NAc = nucleus accumbens.  
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Table 6 
 
Between-group differences for certain positive cues 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
Monetary: TD>ASD       
   Frontal pole Left 162 3.31 -26 56 -4 
   Frontal pole Right 152 3.37 32 52 4 
   Inferior frontal gyrus Left 215 3.23 -54 14 22 
   Juxtapositional lobule cortex Right 63 3.09 6 4 54 
   Middle frontal gyrus Left 102 3.16 26 30 44 
   OFC Left 42 3.79 -34 26 -6 
   Paracingulate gyrus/ACC Right 51 2.87 4 18 38 
   Postcentral gyrus Left 127 3.26 -62 -6 18 
   Precentral gyrus Right 665 3.50 54 -8 44 
   Thalamus Left 42 2.87 -12 -8 2 
Monetary: ASD>TD       
   None       
HAI: TD>ASD       
   Inferior frontal gyrus Left 365 3.50 -56 14 22 
   Paracingulate gyrus/ACC Right 218 3.55 4 20 42 
   Precentral gyrus Right 641 3.74 4 -26 54 
HAI: ASD>TD       
   None       
Social: TD>ASD        
   None       
Social: ASD>TD       
   None       
 
Note.  All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05). ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. OFC = orbital 
frontal cortex.  
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Table 7 
 
Between-group differences for uncertain neutral outcomes across all runs 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region 
 
Side Voxels 
Z 
(Max) X Y Z 
TD>ASD       
   ACC Bilateral 51 3.06 0 -6 38 
   ACC/Paracingulate gyrus Right 45 2.90 4 42 4 
   Frontal operculum cortex/Insula/OFC Left 135 5.67 -34 26 4 
ASD>TD       
   None       
 
Note. aTwo clusters within same region, coordinates and peak activation reported for 
highest peak activation. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are 
significant at Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  ACC = anterior cingulate cortex.  
OFC= orbital frontal cortex.  
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Table 8 
 
Uncertainty x group interaction in the outcome phase 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region 
 
Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
   Central opercular cortex/Insula Left 50 3.93 -38 2 12 
   Frontal pole Left 42 2.91 -36 46 22 
 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  
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Table 9 
 
Between-group differences for certain neutral outcomes across all runs 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region 
 
Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
TD>ASD       
   None       
ASD>TD       
   Caudate nucleus/Thalamus Right 176 3.78 12 -4 16 
 
Note.  All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  
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Table 10 
 
Between-group differences for uncertain neutral outcomes 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
Monetary: TD>ASD       
   Insula/OFC Left 80 6.19 -32 28 4 
Monetary: ASD>TD       
   None       
HAI: TD>ASD       
   Central opercular cortex/Insula Left 131 5.36 -38 2 12 
   Inferior frontal gyrus/OFC Right 39 3.42 54 26 -6 
   Superior frontal gyrus/Paracingulate Left 160 3.51 -2 48 36 
HAI: ASD>TD       
   Frontal pole Left 56 2.93 -40 60 6 
   Precentral gyrus Right 40 3.22 36 -2 62 
   Superior frontal gyrus Left 139 3.28 -26 0 62 
Social: TD>ASD       
   Caudate nucleus/Thalamus Left 83 3.69 -10 -2 12 
   Superior frontal gyrus Left 231 3.35 -10 16 64 
Social: ASD>TD       
   None       
 
Note. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are significant at 
Z>2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  OFC= orbital frontal cortex.  
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Table 11 
 
Between-group differences for uncertain positive outcomes 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
Monetary: TD>ASD       
   Caudate nucleus Right 63 5.03 12 -4 16 
Money: ASD>TD       
     None       
HAI: TD>ASD       
   OFC Right 40 2.92 42 42 -2 
   Thalamus Right 60 2.99 12 -22 8 
HAI: ASD>TD       
   None       
Social: TD>ASD       
   None       
Social: ASD>TD       
   Middle frontal gyrus Right 54 2.83 40 22 40 
   Superior frontal gyrus Left 152 3.09 -2 22 56 
 
Note. All clusters are significant at Z > 2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  OFC = orbital 
frontal cortex.  
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Table 12 
 
Between-group differences for certain positive outcomes 
 
    MNI Coordinates 
Brain Region Side Voxels Z (Max) X Y Z 
Monetary: TD>ASD       
   Frontal pole Left 56 3.00 -14 48 44 
   Frontal polea Right 517 3.31 38 44 42 
   Paracingulate gyrus Left 69 2.94 -4 32 38 
   Parcingulate gyrus/ACC Right 113 2.99 10 52 4 
   Superior frontal gyrus Left 46 3.00 -2 16 60 
Monetary: ASD>TD       
     None       
HAI: TD>ASD       
   Middle frontal gyrus Left 41 3.01 -42 12 42 
HAI: ASD>TD       
   ACC Left 60 3.01 -2 34 20 
Social: TD>ASD       
   Frontal pole Left 56 2.91 -40 40 24 
   Frontal pole Right 98 3.22 42 38 14 
Social: ASD>TD       
   None       
 
Note. aTwo clusters within same region, coordinates and peak activation reported for 
highest peak activation. All coordinates (x, y, z) are given in MNI space. All clusters are 
significant at Z > 2.3, (cluster-corrected at p < .05).  ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. 
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Table 13 
 
Average number of beads/faces drawn in high-uncertainty and low-uncertainty social 
and non-social conditions for the ASD group and TD group 
 
 ASD (N= 16) 
Mean (SD) 
TD (N= 12) 
Mean (SD) 
Non-social high-uncertainty 
condition 
4.94 (3.75) 2.92 (2.43) 
Non-social low-uncertainty 
condition 
3.67 (2.77) 1.67 (1.07) 
Social high-uncertainty 
condition 
4.69 (3.81) 4.42 (3.80) 
Social low-uncertainty 
condition 
3.56 (2.68) 2.67 (2.02) 
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Table 14 
 
Correlations among questionnaire data 
 
 IUS-C IUS-P RBS-R 
Control     
   IUS-C -- .52* .52* 
   IUS-P .52* -- .16 
   SRS  -.22 .26 -.24 
   RBS-R .52* .16 -- 
   ADOS  N/A N/A N/A 
   RCADS .23 .54** .31 
   SCARED .16 .44* -.23 
   Age -.23 -.26 .15 
   IQ -.12 .46* -.26 
ASD    
   IUS-C -- .06 .29 
   IUS-P .06 -- .51** 
   RBS-R .51** 0.29 -- 
   SRS  .24 .25 .69** 
   ADOS  .04 -.27 .03 
   RCADS .39* .40* .51** 
   SCARED .16 .79** .59** 
   Age .41* -.11 -.06 
   IQ -.04 -.19 -.24 
 
Note.  * = p < .05; ** p < .01. 
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Figure 1. fMRI uncertainty task conditions and trial structure. Each run included an 
anticipation phase with three possible cues (uncertain cues, certain positive cues, and 
certain neutral cues) and an outcome phase with four possible outcomes (uncertain 
positive outcome, uncertain neutral outcome, certain positive outcome, and certain 
neutral outcome).  Uncertain cues indicated a 50% chance of a subsequent uncertain 
positive outcome and a 50% chance of an uncertain neutral outcome.  Certain positive 
cues indicated a 100% chance of a subsequent certain positive outcome.  Certain neutral 
cues indicated 100% chance of certain neutral outcome. 
  
	   80	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Beads task conditions. The non-social high-uncertainty condition included a jar 
with a 60:40 green:purple bead ratio and a jar with a 40:60 green:purple bead ratio.  The 
non-social low-uncertainty condition included a jar with an 85:15 blue:red bead ratio and 
an 15:85 blue:red bead ratio.  The social high-uncertainty condition included 60:40 
happy:angry face ratio and a 40:60 happy:angry face ratio.  The social low-uncertainty 
condition included an 85:15 happy:angry face ratio and a 15:85 happy:angry face ratio. 
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Figure 3.  Between-group differences for uncertain cues across all runs. The ASD group 
demonstrated reduced activation of frontolimbic regions relative to the TD group, 
including the right caudate nucleus/putamen, bilateral thalamus, and bilateral inferior 
frontal gyrus.  R = right. 
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Figure 4. Between-group differences for certain neutral cues across all runs. The ASD 
group demonstrated greater activation of frontolimbic regions relative to the TD group, 
including the right nucleus accumbens (NAc)/caudate nucleus, right middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG), right superior frontal gyrus (SFG), right paracingulate gyrus, and right frontal 
operculum cortex (FOC)/orbital frontal cortex (OFC).  R = right. 
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Figure 5.  Between-group differences for uncertain cues. Relative to the TD group, the 
ASD group demonstrated reduced activation of the right thalamus during uncertain cues 
in the monetary run, reduced activation of frontolimbic regions, including the left caudate 
nucleus/nucleus accumbens (NAc), during uncertain cues in the HAI run, and reduced 
activation of frontolimbic regions including the right caudate nucleus during uncertain 
cues in the social run.  L = left. Right = right.  
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Figure 6.  Between-group differences for certain positive cues.   Relative to the TD group, 
the ASD group demonstrated reduced activation of frontal and thalamic regions including 
the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG), left orbital frontal cortex (OFC), left frontal pole, 
bilateral precentral gyrus, left thalamus, and left postcentral gyrus during certain 
monetary cues, and reduced activation of frontal regions including the right precentral 
gyrus and right paracingulate gyrus/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during certain HAI 
cues.  L = left. R = right.  
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Figure 7. Between-group differences for uncertain neutral outcomes across all runs. The 
ASD group demonstrated reduced activation of the left frontal operculum cortex (FOC), 
left insula, left orbital frontal cortex (OFC), bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and 
right paracingulate gyrus, relative to the TD group. L = left. R = right. 
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Figure 8. Between-group differences for certain neutral outcomes across all runs. The 
ASD group demonstrated greater activation of right caudate nucleus/thalamus, relative to 
the TD group. R = right. 
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Figure 9.  Between-group differences for uncertain neutral outcomes. Relative to the TD 
group, the ASD group demonstrated reduced activation of the left insula/orbital frontal 
cortex (OFC) during uncertain neutral outcomes in the monetary run, reduced activation 
of frontal regions including the left central opercular cortex/insula, and increased 
activation of frontal regions including the left superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and left 
frontal pole during uncertain neutral outcomes in the HAI run, and reduced activation of 
the left superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and left caudate nucleus during uncertain neutral 
outcomes in the social run. L = left. R = right. 
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Figure 10. Between-group differences for uncertain positive outcomes.  Relative to the 
TD group, the ASD group demonstrated reduced activation of the right caudate nucleus 
during uncertain monetary outcomes, reduced activation of the right thalamus during 
uncertain HAI outcomes, and increased activation of frontal regions including the middle 
frontal gyrus (MFG) during uncertain social outcomes. R = right. 
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Figure 11.  Between-group differences for certain positive outcomes. Relative to the TD 
group, the ASD demonstrated reduced activation of frontal regions including the right 
frontal pole, right paracingulate gyrus, and right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during 
certain monetary outcomes, reduced activation of the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 
and increased activation of the left anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during certain HAI 
outcomes, and reduced activation of the left frontal pole during certain social outcomes.  
L = left. R = right.
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Figure 12. Average number of beads/faces drawn in each condition of the beads task for 
the ASD group and TD group. The ASD group drew significantly more beads before 
making a decision in the non-social low-uncertainty condition than the TD group.  Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  * = p < .05.  
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APPENDIX 1: FMRI TASK STIMULI 
 
 
Social (face) images: 
 
 
Faces (from the NimStim set of happy female faces, closed mouth):  01F_HA_C, 
02F_HA_C, 03F_HA_C, 04F_HA_C, 05F_HA_C, 06F_HA_C, 07F_HA_C, 08F_HA_C, 
09F_HA_C, 10F_HA_C, 11F_HA_C, 12F_HA_C, 13F_HA_C, 14F_HA_C, 15F_HA_C, 
16F_HA_C, 17F_HA_C, 18F_HA_C 
 
 
Neutral International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images during the social run:  
 
IAPS numbers: 7000, 7004, 7020, 7041, 7043, 7050, 7056, 7059, 7090, 7160, 7170, 7161, 
7180, 7182, 7185, 7187, 7235, 7705 
 
High autism interest (HAI)/ Circumscribed interest images: 
Images available at: http://can.unc.edu/content/site/resources/ 
HAI images (females): 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 39  
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HAI images (males): 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 39 
 
 
 
Neutral International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images during the HAI run:  
 
 
 
IAPS numbers: 7002, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7014, 7019, 7032, 7034, 7035, 7045, 7053, 7055, 
7175, 7179, 7207, 7217, 7233, 7247 
 
 
 
 
 
Button box image: 
 
 
 
 
  
	   93	  
 
REFERENCES 
Anselme, P. (2010). The uncertainty processing theory of motivation. Behavioural brain 
research, 208(2), 291-310.  
APA. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-V (5th ed.). 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Aron, A. R., Shohamy, D., Clark, J., Myers, C., Gluck, M. A., & Poldrack, R. A. (2004). 
Human midbrain sensitivity to cognitive feedback and uncertainty during 
classification learning. Journal of Neurophysiology, 92(2), 1144-1152.  
Baillargeon, R. (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects: evidence for event‐
general and event‐specific expectations. Developmental Science, 7(4), 391-414.  
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). Do autistic children have obsessions and compulsions? British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28(3), 193-200.  
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory 
of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37-46.  
Baron-Cohen, S., & Wheelwright, S. (1999). 'Obsessions' in children with autism or 
Asperger syndrome. Content analysis in terms of core domains of cognition. The 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 175(5), 484-490.  
Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2007). 
Learning the value of information in an uncertain world. Nature, 10(9), 1214-
1221.  
Berns, G. S., McClure, S. M., Pagnoni, G., & Montague, P. R. (2001). Predictability 
modulates human brain response to reward. The Journal of Neuroscience, 21(8), 
2793-2798.  
Berridge, K. C. (2004). Motivation concepts in behavioral neuroscience. Physiology & 
Behavior, 81(2), 179-209.  
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2003). Parsing reward. Trends in Neurosciences, 
26(9), 507-513.  
  
	   94	  
Birmaher, B., Brent, D. A., Chiappetta, L., Bridge, J., Monga, S., & Baugher, M. (1999). 
Psychometric properties of the Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional 
Disorders (SCARED): a replication study. Journal of the American Academy of 
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 38(10), 1230-1236.  
Birmaher, B., Khetarpal, S., Brent, D., Cully, M., Balach, L., Kaufman, J., & Neer, S. M. 
(1997). The screen for child anxiety related emotional disorders (SCARED): 
Scale construction and psychometric characteristics. Journal of the American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 36(4), 545-553.  
Bjork, J. M., Knutson, B., Fong, G. W., Caggiano, D. M., Bennett, S. M., & Hommer, D. 
(2004). Incentive-elicited brain activation in adolescents: similarities and 
differences from young adults. Journal of Neuroscience, 24(8), 1793-1793.  
Bodfish, J., Symons, F., & Lewis, M. (1999). The Repetitive Behavior Scale: Test 
Manual. Morganton, NC. 
Boelen, P. A., & Reijntjes, A. (2009). Intolerance of uncertainty and social anxiety. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23(1), 130-135.  
Boelen, P. A., Vrinssen, I., & Van Tulder, F. (2010). Intolerance of uncertainty in 
adolescents: Correlations with worry, social anxiety, and depression. The Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 198(3), 194-200.  
Bölte, S., Poustka, F., & Constantino, J. N. (2008). Assessing autistic traits: cross‐
cultural validation of the social responsiveness scale (SRS). Autism Research, 
1(6), 354-363.  
Borkovec, T. D., Alcaine, O., & Behar, E. (2004). Avoidance theory of worry and 
generalized anxiety disorder. Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Advances in 
Research and Practice, 2004.  
Boucher, J. (1977). Alternation and sequencing behaviour, and response to novelty in 
autistic children. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 18(1), 67-72.  
Boulter, C., Freeston, M., South, M., & Rodgers, J. (2013). Intolerance of uncertainty as a 
framework for understanding anxiety in children and adolescents with autism 
spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 1-12.  
  
	   95	  
Boyd, B. A., Conroy, M. A., Mancil, G. R., Nakao, T., & Alter, P. J. (2007). Effects of 
circumscribed interests on the social behaviors of children with autism spectrum 
disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(8), 1550-1561.  
Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., & Cohen, J. D. (1999). Mechanisms of cognitive control: 
Active memory, inhibition, and the prefrontal cortex. Pittsburgh (PA): Carnegie 
Mellon University, 746-763.  
Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (1999). Dopamine, cognitive control, and schizophrenia: 
the gating model. Progress in Brain Research, 121, 327-349.  
Broome, M. R., Johns, L., Valli, I., Woolley, J., Tabraham, P., Brett, C., . . . McGuire, P. 
(2007). Delusion formation and reasoning biases in those at clinical high risk for 
psychosis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 191(51), s38-s42.  
Brosnan, M., Chapman, E., & Ashwin, C. (2014). Adolescents with autism spectrum 
disorder show a circumspect reasoning bias rather than'jumping-to-conclusions'. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 44(3), 513-520.  
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2002). The intolerance of uncertainty scale: Psychometric 
properties of the English version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(8), 931-
945.  
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2009). The role of fear of anxiety and intolerance of 
uncertainty in worry: An experimental manipulation. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 47(3), 215-223.  
Burock, M. A., Buckner, R. L., Woldorff, M. G., Rosen, B. R., & Dale, A. M. (1998). 
Randomized event-related experimental designs allow for extremely rapid 
presentation rates using functional MRI. Neuroreport, 9(16), 3735-3739.  
Carter, R. M., MacInnes, J. J., Huettel, S. A., & Adcock, R. A. (2009). Activation in the 
VTA and nucleus accumbens increases in anticipation of both gains and losses. 
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 3, 21.  
Chamberlain, P. D., Rodgers, J., Crowley, M. J., White, S. E., Freeston, M. H., & South, 
M. (2013). A potentiated startle study of uncertainty and contextual anxiety in 
adolescents diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Molecular Autism, 4(1), 1-
11.  
  
	   96	  
Charlop, M. H., & Haymes, L. K. (1996). Using obsessions as reinforcers with and 
without mild reductive procedures to decrease autistic children's inappropriate 
behaviors. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 26, 527-546.  
Chevallier, C., Kohls, G., Troiani, V., Brodkin, E. S., & Schultz, R. T. (2012). The social 
motivation theory of autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(4), 231-239.  
Chorpita, B., Yim, L., Moffitt, C., Umemoto, L., & Francis, S. (2000). Assessment of 
symptoms of DSM-IV anxiety and depression in children: a revised child anxiety 
and depression scale. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(8), 835-855.  
Comer, J. S., Roy, A. K., Furr, J. M., Gotimer, K., Beidas, R. S., Dugas, M. J., & Kendall, 
P. C. (2009). The intolerance of uncertainty scale for children: a psychometric 
evaluation. Psychological Assessment, 21(3), 402-411.  
Constantino, J. N., Davis, S. A., Todd, R. D., Schindler, M. K., Gross, M. M., Brophy, S. 
L., . . . Reich, W. (2003). Validation of a brief quantitative measure of autistic 
traits: Comparison of the social responsiveness scale with the autism diagnostic 
interview-revised. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 33(4), 427-
433.  
Constantino, J. N., & Gruber, C. P. (2002). The social responsiveness scale. Los Angeles: 
Western Psychological Services.  
Constantino, J. N., Przybeck, T., Friesen, D., & Todd, R. D. (2000). Reciprocal social 
behavior in children with and without pervasive developmental disorders. Journal 
of Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics, 21, 2-11.  
Cooper, J. C., & Knutson, B. (2008). Valence and salience contribute to nucleus 
accumbens activation. Neuroimage, 39(1), 538-547.  
Corona, R., Dissanayake, C., Arbelle, S., Wellington, P., & Sigman, M. (1998). Is affect 
aversive to young children with autism? Behavioral and cardiac responses to 
experimenter distress. Child Development, 69(6), 1494-1502.  
Courchesne, E., Kilman, B. A., Galambos, R., & Lincoln, A. J. (1984). Autism: 
processing of novel auditory information assessed by event-related brain 
potentials. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology/Evoked 
Potentials Section, 59(3), 238-248.  
  
	   97	  
Courchesne, E., Lincoln, A. J., Kilman, B. A., & Galambos, R. (1985). Event-related 
brain potential correlates of the processing of novel visual and auditory 
information in autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 15(1), 
55-76.  
Dale, A. M. (1999). Optimal experimental design for event-related fMRI. Human Brain 
Mapping, 8(2-3), 109-114.  
Dalton, K. M., Nacewicz, B. M., Johnstone, T., Schaefer, H. S., Gernsbacher, M. A., 
Goldsmith, H., . . . Davidson, R. J. (2005). Gaze fixation and the neural circuitry 
of face processing in autism. Nature Neuroscience, 8(4), 519-526.  
Dawson, G., & Lewy, A. (1989). Arousal, attention, and the socioemotional impairments 
of individuals with autism. In G. Dawson (Ed.), Autism: Nature, Diagnosis, and 
Treatment (pp. 49-74). New York: Guilford Press. 
Dawson, G., Meltzoff, A., Osterling, J., Rinaldi, J., & Brown, E. (1998). Children with 
autism fail to orient to naturally occurring social stimuli. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 28(6), 479-485.  
Dawson, G., Rogers, S., Munson, J., Smith, M., Winter, J., Greenson, J., . . . Varley, J. 
(2010). Randomized, controlled trial of an intervention for toddlers with autism: 
the Early Start Denver Model. Pediatrics, 125(1), e17-e17.  
Dawson, G., Toth, K., Abbott, R., Osterling, J., Munson, J., Estes, A., & Liaw, J. (2004). 
Early social attention impairments in autism: Social orienting, joint attention, and 
attention to distress. Developmental Psychology, 40(2), 271-282.  
Dawson, M., Mottron, L., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (2008). Learning in autism. Learning 
and memory: A comprehensive reference, 2, 759-772.  
de Bruin, G. O., Rassin, E., van der Heiden, C., & Muris, P. (2006). Psychometric 
properties of a Dutch version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. Netherlands 
Journal of Psychology, 62(2), 87-92.  
De Martino, B., Harrison, N. A., Knafo, S., Bird, G., & Dolan, R. J. (2008). Explaining 
enhanced logical consistency during decision making in autism. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 28(42), 10746-10750.  
  
	   98	  
Delgado, M. R., Miller, M. M., Inati, S., & Phelps, E. A. (2005). An fMRI study of 
reward-related probability learning. Neuroimage, 24(3), 862-873.  
Delmonte, S., Balsters, J. H., McGrath, J., Fitzgerald, J., Brennan, S., Fagan, A. J., & 
Gallagher, L. (2012). Social and monetary reward processing in autism spectrum 
disorders. Molecular Autism, 3(1), 7.  
Desikan, R. S., Ségonne, F., Fischl, B., Quinn, B. T., Dickerson, B. C., Blacker, D., . . . 
Hyman, B. T. (2006). An automated labeling system for subdividing the human 
cerebral cortex on MRI scans into gyral based regions of interest. Neuroimage, 
31(3), 968-980.  
Dichter, G. S., Felder, J. N., Green, S. R., Rittenberg, A. M., Sasson, N. J., & Bodfish, J. 
W. (2012). Reward circuitry function in autism spectrum disorders. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(2), 160-172.  
Dichter, G. S., Richey, J. A., Rittenberg, A. M., Sabatino, A., & Bodfish, J. W. (2012). 
Reward circuitry function in autism during face anticipation and outcomes. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 42(2), 147-160.  
Downar, J., Crawley, A. P., Mikulis, D. J., & Davis, K. D. (2002). A cortical network 
sensitive to stimulus salience in a neutral behavioral context across multiple 
sensory modalities. Journal of Neurophysiology, 87(1), 615-620.  
Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., & Freeston, M. H. (1998). Generalized anxiety 
disorder: A preliminary test of a conceptual model. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 36(2), 215-226.  
Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (2000). Treatment of GAD. Targeting intolerance of 
uncertainty in two types of worry. Behavior Modification, 24(5), 635.  
Dugas, M. J., Ladouceur, R., Léger, E., Freeston, M. H., Langolis, F., Provencher, M. D., 
& Boisvert, J. M. (2003). Group cognitive-behavioral therapy for generalized 
anxiety disorder: treatment outcome and long-term follow-up. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71(4), 821.  
Dugas, M. J., Laugesen, N., & Bukowski, W. M. (2012). Intolerance of uncertainty, fear 
of anxiety, and adolescent worry. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 1-8.  
  
	   99	  
Dugas, M. J., Savard, P., Gaudet, A., Turcotte, J., Laugesen, N., Robichaud, M., . . . 
Koerner, N. (2007). Can the components of a cognitive model predict the severity 
of generalized anxiety disorder? Behavior Therapy, 38(2), 169-178.  
Dugas, M. J., Schwartz, A., & Francis, K. (2004). Brief report: Intolerance of uncertainty, 
worry, and depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28(6), 835-842.  
Egger, H. L., Pine, D. S., Nelson, E., Leibenluft, E., Ernst, M., Towbin, K. E., & Angold, 
A. (2011). The NIMH Child Emotional Faces Picture Set (NIMH‐ChEFS): a 
new set of children's facial emotion stimuli. International Journal of Methods in 
Psychiatric Research, 20(3), 145-156.  
Ferrara, C., & Hill, S. D. (1980). The responsiveness of autistic children to the 
predictability of social and nonsocial toys. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 10(1), 51-57.  
Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N., & Schultz, W. (2003). Discrete coding of reward 
probability and uncertainty by dopamine neurons. Science, 299(5614), 1898-1898.  
Frank, G. K. W., Roblek, T., Shott, M. E., Jappe, L. M., Rollin, M. D. H., Hagman, J. O., 
& Pryor, T. (2012). Heightened fear of uncertainty in anorexia and bulimia 
nervosa. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 45(2), 227-232.  
Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do 
people worry? Personality and Individual Differences, 17(6), 791-802.  
Gabriels, R. L., Cuccaro, M. L., Hill, D. E., Ivers, B. J., & Goldson, E. (2005). Repetitive 
behaviors in autism: Relationships with associated clinical features. Research in 
Developmental Disabilities, 26(2), 169-181.  
Galvan, A., Hare, T. A., Parra, C. E., Penn, J., Voss, H., Glover, G., & Casey, B. (2006). 
Earlier development of the accumbens relative to orbitofrontal cortex might 
underlie risk-taking behavior in adolescents. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26(25), 
6885-6892.  
Garety, P. A., Freeman, D., Jolley, S., Dunn, G., Bebbington, P. E., Fowler, D. G., . . . 
Dudley, R. (2005). Reasoning, emotions, and delusional conviction in psychosis. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(3), 373.  
  
	   100	  
Germans, M. K., & Kring, A. M. (2000). Hedonic deficit in anhedonia: support for the 
role of approach motivation. Personality and Individual Differences, 28(4), 659-
672.  
Gillott, A., & Standen, P. (2007). Levels of anxiety and sources of stress in adults with 
autism. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities, 11(4), 359-370.  
Gomot, M., Belmonte, M. K., Bullmore, E. T., Bernard, F. A., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2008). 
Brain hyper-reactivity to auditory novel targets in children with high-functioning 
autism. Brain, 131(9), 2479-2488.  
Gomot, M., Bernard, F. A., Davis, M. H., Belmonte, M. K., Ashwin, C., Bullmore, E. T., 
& Baron-Cohen, S. (2006). Change detection in children with autism: an auditory 
event-related fMRI study. Neuroimage, 29(2), 475-484.  
Gotham, K., Bishop, S. L., Hus, V., Huerta, M., Lund, S., Buja, A., . . . Lord, C. (2013). 
Exploring the relationship between anxiety and insistence on sameness in autism 
spectrum disorders. Autism Research, 6(1), 33-41.  
Gotham, K., Pickles, A., & Lord, C. (2009). Standardizing ADOS scores for a measure of 
severity in autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 39(5), 693-705.  
Gottfried, J. A., O'Doherty, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). Encoding predictive reward value 
in human amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex. Science, 301(5636), 1104-1107.  
Grisset, N. I., & Norvell, N. K. (1992). Perceived social support, social skills, and quality 
of relationships in bulimic women. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 60(2), 293.  
Grupe, D. W., & Nitschke, J. B. (2011). Uncertainty is associated with biased 
expectancies and heightened responses to aversion. Emotion, 11(2), 413.  
Haber, S. N., & McFarland, N. R. (1999). The concept of the ventral striatum in 
nonhuman primates. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 877(1), 33-48.  
Hallett, V., Ronald, A., Colvert, E., Ames, C., Woodhouse, E., Lietz, S., . . . Scahill, L. 
(2013). Exploring anxiety symptoms in a large‐scale twin study of children with 
  
	   101	  
autism spectrum disorders, their co‐ twins and controls. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 54(11), 1176-1185.  
Ham, T., Leff, A., de Boissezon, X., Joffe, A., & Sharp, D. J. (2013). Cognitive control 
and the salience network: an investigation of error processing and effective 
connectivity. The Journal of Neuroscience, 33(16), 7091-7098.  
Heller, W., Nitschke, J. B., & Miller, G. A. (1998). Lateralization in emotion and 
emotional disorders. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26-32.  
Herry, C., Bach, D. R., Esposito, F., Di Salle, F., Perrig, W. J., Scheffler, K., . . . Seifritz, 
E. (2007). Processing of temporal unpredictability in human and animal amygdala. 
The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(22), 5958-5966.  
Herwig, U., Baumgartner, T., Kaffenberger, T., Brühl, A., Kottlow, M., Schreiter-Gasser, 
U., . . . Rufer, M. (2007). Modulation of anticipatory emotion and perception 
processing by cognitive control. Neuroimage, 37(2), 652-662.  
Herwig, U., Kaffenberger, T., Baumgartner, T., & Jäncke, L. (2007). Neural correlates of 
a ‘pessimistic’attitude when anticipating events of unknown emotional valence. 
Neuroimage, 34(2), 848-858.  
Hikosaka, O., Nakamura, K., & Nakahara, H. (2006). Basal ganglia orient eyes to reward. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 95(2), 567-584.  
Hill, E. L. (2004). Executive dysfunction in autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(1), 
26-32.  
Holaway, R. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Coles, M. E. (2006). A comparison of intolerance 
of uncertainty in analogue obsessive-compulsive disorder and generalized anxiety 
disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 20(2), 158-174.  
Holm, S. (1979). A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. Scandinavian 
Journal of Statistics, 65-70.  
Horvitz, J. (2000). Mesolimbocortical and nigrostriatal dopamine responses to salient 
non-reward events. Neuroscience, 96(4), 651-656.  
  
	   102	  
Hsu, M., Bhatt, M., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Camerer, C. F. (2005). Neural systems 
responding to degrees of uncertainty in human decision-making. Science, 
310(5754), 1680-1680.  
Huettel, S. A., Stowe, C. J., Gordon, E. M., Warner, B. T., & Platt, M. L. (2006). Neural 
signatures of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity. Neuron, 49(5), 765.  
Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1988). Probabilistic judgements in deluded 
and non-deluded subjects. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: 
Human Experimental Psychology, 40(4-A), 801-812.  
Hus, V., Gotham, K., & Lord, C. (2012). Standardizing ADOS domain scores: Separating 
severity of social affect and restricted and repetitive behaviors. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 44(10), 2400-2412.  
Hutt, C., Hutt, S., Lee, D., & Ounsted, C. (1964). Arousal and childhood autism.  
Jänsch, C., & Hare, D. (2014). An investigation of the" jumping to conclusions" data-
gathering bias and paranoid thoughts in asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 44(1), 111-119.  
Jenkinson, M., Bannister, P., Brady, M., & Smith, S. M. (2002). Improved optimization 
for the robust and accurate linear registration and motion correction of brain 
images. Neuroimage, 17(2), 825-841.  
Jenkinson, M., & Smith, S. M. (2001). A global optimisation method for robust affine 
registration of brain images. Medical Image Analysis, 5(2), 143-156.  
Jensen, J., Willeit, M., Zipursky, R. B., Savina, I., Smith, A. J., Menon, M., . . . Kapur, S. 
(2007). The formation of abnormal associations in schizophrenia: neural and 
behavioral evidence. Neuropsychopharmacology, 33(3), 473-479.  
Jensen, V. K., & Sinclair, L. V. (2002). Treatment of autism in young children: 
Behavioral intervention and applied behavior analysis. Infants & Young Children, 
14(4), 42-52.  
Johnson, S. A., Filliter, J. H., & Murphy, R. R. (2009). Discrepancies between self-and 
parent-perceptions of autistic traits and empathy in high functioning children and 
  
	   103	  
adolescents on the autism spectrum. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 39(12), 1706-1714.  
Joshua, M., Adler, A., & Bergman, H. (2010). Novelty encoding by the output neurons of 
the basal ganglia. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 3, 20.  
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2(2), 217-
230.  
Kanner, L. (1944). Early infantile autism. The Journal of Pediatrics, 25(3), 211-217.  
Kasari, C. (2002). Assessing change in early intervention programs for children with 
autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 32(5), 447-461.  
Kaufman, A. S. (1990). Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test: KBIT: AGS, American 
Guidance Service. 
Klin, A., Danovitch, J. H., Merz, A. B., & Volkmar, F. R. (2007). Circumscribed interests 
in higher functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders: An exploratory 
study. Research and Practice for Persons with Severe Disabilities, 32(2), 89-100.  
Koch, K., Schachtzabel, C., Wagner, G., Reichenbach, J. R., Sauer, H., & Schlösser, R. 
(2008). The neural correlates of reward-related trial-and-error learning: an fMRI 
study with a probabilistic learning task. Learning & Memory, 15(10), 728-728.  
Koch, K., Schachtzabel, C., Wagner, G., Schikora, J., Schultz, C., Reichenbach, J. R., . . . 
Schlösser, R. G. M. (2010). Altered activation in association with reward-related 
trial-and-error learning in patients with schizophrenia. Neuroimage, 50(1), 223-
232.  
Koch, K., Wagner, G., Schachtzabel, C., Schultz, C. C., Güllmar, D., Reichenbach, J. 
R., . . . Schlösser, R. G. M. (2011). Neural activation and radial diffusivity in 
schizophrenia: combined fMRI and diffusion tensor imaging study. The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 198(3), 223-229.  
Koegel, L. K., Koegel, R. L., Harrower, J. K., & Carter, C. M. (1999). Pivotal response 
intervention I: Overview of approach. The Journal of the Association for Persons 
with Severe Handicaps, 24(3), 174-185.  
  
	   104	  
Koerner, N., & Dugas, M. J. (2006). A cognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder: 
The role of intolerance of uncertainty. Worry and its Psychological Disorders, 
201-216.  
Koerner, N., & Dugas, M. J. (2008). An investigation of appraisals in individuals 
vulnerable to excessive worry: the role of intolerance of uncertainty. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 32(5), 619-638.  
Konstantellou, A., & Reynolds, M. (2010). Intolerance of uncertainty and metacognitions 
in a non-clinical sample with problematic and normal eating attitudes. Eating 
Behaviors, 11(3), 193-196.  
Kootz, J. P., Marinelli, B., & Cohen, D. J. (1982). Modulation of response to 
environmental stimulation in autistic children. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 12(2), 185-193.  
Koshino, H., Kana, R. K., Keller, T. A., Cherkassky, V. L., Minshew, N. J., & Just, M. A. 
(2008). fMRI investigation of working memory for faces in autism: visual coding 
and underconnectivity with frontal areas. Cerebral Cortex, 18(2), 289-300.  
Krain, A. L., Gotimer, K., Hefton, S., Ernst, M., Castellanos, F. X., Pine, D. S., & 
Milham, M. P. (2008). A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of 
uncertainty in adolescents with anxiety disorders. Biological Psychiatry, 63(6), 
563-568.  
Krasny, L., Williams, B. J., Provencal, S., & Ozonoff, S. (2003). Social skills 
interventions for the autism spectrum: essential ingredients and a model 
curriculum. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 12(1), 
107-122.  
Kringelbach, M. L., & Berridge, K. C. (2009). Towards a functional neuroanatomy of 
pleasure and happiness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(11), 479-487.  
Krug, A., Cabanis, M., Pyka, M., Pauly, K., Kellermann, T., Walter, H., . . . Winterer, G. 
(2014). Attenuated prefrontal activation during decision-making under uncertainty 
in schizophrenia: A multi-center fMRI study. Schizophrenia research, 152(1), 
176-183.  
Kuusikko, S., Pollock-Wurman, R., Jussila, K., Carter, A. S., Mattila, M.-L., Ebeling, 
H., . . . Moilanen, I. (2008). Social anxiety in high-functioning children and 
  
	   105	  
adolescents with autism and Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 38(9), 1697-1709.  
Lachance, S., Dugas, M., & Ladouceur, R. (1995). Worry: Specific contributions of 
intolerance of uncertainty, thought suppression and worry appraisal. 
Ladouceur, R., Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., Léger, E., Gagnon, F., & Thibodeau, N. 
(2000). Efficacy of a cognitive–behavioral treatment for generalized anxiety 
disorder: Evaluation in a controlled clinical trial. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 68(6), 957-964.  
Ladouceur, R., Gosselin, P., & Dugas, M. J. (2000). Experimental manipulation of 
intolerance of uncertainty: A study of a theoretical model of worry. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 38(9), 933-941.  
Ladouceur, R., Talbot, F., & Dugas, M. J. (1997a). Behavioral expressions of intolerance 
of uncertainty in worry. Behavior Modification, 355-371.  
Ladouceur, R., Talbot, F., & Dugas, M. J. (1997b). Behavioral expressions of intolerance 
of uncertainty in worry. Behavior Modification, 21(3), 355-371.  
Lam, K. S., & Aman, M. G. (2007). The repetitive behavior scale-revised: independent 
validation in individuals with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 37(5), 855-866.  
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1997). International affective picture 
system (IAPS): Technical manual and affective ratings. NIMH Center for the 
Study of Emotion and Attention.  
Lecavalier, L., Leone, S., & Wiltz, J. (2006). The impact of behaviour problems on 
caregiver stress in young people with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of 
Intellectual Disability Research, 50(3), 172-183.  
Leger, E., Ladouceur, R., Dugas, M. J., & Freeston, M. H. (2003). Cognitive-behavioral 
treatment of generalized anxiety disorder among adolescents: A case series. 
Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 42(3), 327-
330.  
  
	   106	  
Levinson, C. A., & Rodebaugh, T. L. (2012). Social anxiety and eating disorder 
comorbidity: The role of negative social evaluation fears. Eating Behaviors, 13(1), 
27-35.  
Levy, I., Snell, J., Nelson, A. J., Rustichini, A., & Glimcher, P. W. (2010). Neural 
representation of subjective value under risk and ambiguity. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 103(2), 1036-1036.  
Limongi, R., Sutherland, S. C., Zhu, J., Young, M. E., & Habib, R. (2013). Temporal 
prediction errors modulate cingulate–insular coupling. NeuroImage, 71, 147-157.  
Lord, C., Risi, S., Lambrecht, L., Cook, E. H., Leventhal, B. L., DiLavore, P. C., . . . 
Rutter, M. (2000). The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule—Generic: A 
standard measure of social and communication deficits associated with the 
spectrum of autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 30(3), 205-
223.  
Lord, C., Rutter, M., & Couteur, A. (1994). Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised: a 
revised version of a diagnostic interview for caregivers of individuals with 
possible pervasive developmental disorders. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 24(5), 659-685.  
Lovaas, O. I., Schreibman, L., & Koegel, R. L. (1974). A behavior modification approach 
to the treatment of autistic children. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 4(2), 111-129.  
Mazziotta, J., Toga, A., Evans, A., Fox, P., Lancaster, J., Zilles, K., . . . Pike, B. (2001). 
A probabilistic atlas and reference system for the human brain: International 
Consortium for Brain Mapping (ICBM). Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 356(1412), 1293-1322.  
McClure, S. M., Berns, G. S., & Montague, P. R. (2003). Temporal prediction errors in a 
passive learning task activate human striatum. Neuron, 38(2), 339-346.  
McClure, S. M., Daw, N. D., & Read Montague, P. (2003). A computational substrate for 
incentive salience. Trends in Neurosciences, 26(8), 423-428.  
McEvoy, P. M., & Mahoney, A. E. J. (2011). To Be Sure, To Be Sure: Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Mediates Symptoms of Various Anxiety Disorders and Depression. 
Behavior Therapy, 43(3), 533-545.  
  
	   107	  
Menon, V., & Uddin, L. Q. (2010). Saliency, switching, attention and control: a network 
model of insula function. Brain Structure and Function, 214(5-6), 655-667.  
Mesibov, G. B., & Shea, V. (2010). The TEACCH program in the era of evidence-based 
practice. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40(5), 570-579.  
Mesibov, G. B., Shea, V., & Schopler, E. (2004). The TEACCH approach to autism 
spectrum disorders: Plenum Pub Corp. 
Monga, S., Birmaher, B., Chiappetta, L., Brent, D., Kaufman, J., Bridge, J., & Cully, M. 
(2000). Screen for child anxiety‐ related emotional disorders (SCARED): 
Convergent and divergent validity. Depression and Anxiety, 12(2), 85-91.  
Monk, C. S., Klein, R. G., Telzer, E. H., Schroth, E. A., Mannuzza, S., Moulton Iii, J. 
L., . . . Fromm, S. (2008). Amygdala and nucleus accumbens activation to 
emotional facial expressions in children and adolescents at risk for major 
depression. American Journal of Psychiatry, 165(1), 90-98.  
Morris, R., Vercammen, A., Lenroot, R., Moore, L., Langton, J., Short, B., . . . Weickert, 
C. (2011). Disambiguating ventral striatum fMRI-related bold signal during 
reward prediction in schizophrenia. Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 280-289.  
Morris, R. W., Vercammen, A., Lenroot, R., Moore, L., Langton, J. M., Short, B., . . . 
Weickert, T. W. (2012). Disambiguating ventral striatum fMRI-related bold 
signal during reward prediction in schizophrenia. Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 280-
289.  
Mushtaq, F., Bland, A. R., & Schaefer, A. (2011). Uncertainty and cognitive control. 
Cognition, 2, 249.  
Nelson, B. D., & Shankman, S. A. (2011). Does intolerance of uncertainty predict 
anticipatory startle responses to uncertain threat? International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 81(2), 107-115.  
Niv, Y., Duff, M. O., & Dayan, P. (2005). Dopamine, uncertainty and TD learning. 
Behavioral and Brain Functions, 1(6), 1-9.  
  
	   108	  
O'Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Friston, K., Critchley, H., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). Temporal 
difference models and reward-related learning in the human brain. Neuron, 38(2), 
329-337.  
Pagnoni, G., Zink, C. F., Montague, P. R., & Berns, G. S. (2002). Activity in human 
ventral striatum locked to errors of reward prediction. Nature Neuroscience, 5(2), 
97-98.  
Paulus, M. P., Feinstein, J. S., Simmons, A., & Stein, M. B. (2004). Anterior cingulate 
activation in high trait anxious subjects is related to altered error processing 
during decision making. Biological Psychiatry, 55(12), 1179-1187.  
Paulus, M. P., Hozack, N. E., Zauscher, B. E., Frank, L., Brown, G. G., McDowell, J., & 
Braff, D. L. (2002). Parietal dysfunction is associated with increased outcome-
related decision-making in schizophrenia patients. Biological Psychiatry, 51(12), 
995-1004.  
Phillips, L. D., & Edwards, W. (1966). Conservatism in a simple probability inference 
task. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72(3), 346-354.  
Pierce, K., & Courchesne, E. (2001). Evidence for a cerebellar role in reduced 
exploration and stereotyped behavior in autism. Biological Psychiatry, 49(8), 655-
664.  
Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J., Shiv, B., & Rangel, A. (2008). Marketing actions can 
modulate neural representations of experienced pleasantness. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 105(3), 1050-1054.  
Preuschoff, K., & Bossaerts, P. (2007). Adding prediction risk to the theory of reward 
learning. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1104(1), 135-146.  
Preuschoff, K., Quartz, S. R., & Bossaerts, P. (2008). Human insula activation reflects 
risk prediction errors as well as risk. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(11), 2745-
2752.  
Prior, M., & Macmillan, M. B. (1973). Maintenance of sameness in children with 
Kanner's syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 3(2), 154-
167.  
  
	   109	  
Pushkarskaya, H., Liu, X., Smithson, M., & Joseph, J. E. (2010). Beyond risk and 
ambiguity: Deciding under ignorance. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 10(3), 382-391.  
Reaven, J., Blakeley‐Smith, A., Culhane‐Shelburne, K., & Hepburn, S. (2012). Group 
cognitive behavior therapy for children with high‐functioning autism spectrum 
disorders and anxiety: A randomized trial. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 53(4), 410-419.  
Richler, J., Bishop, S. L., Kleinke, J. R., & Lord, C. (2007). Restricted and repetitive 
behaviors in young children with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 37(1), 73-85.  
Rodgers, J., Glod, M., Connolly, B., & McConachie, H. (2012). The relationship between 
anxiety and repetitive behaviours in autism Spectrum Disorder. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 1-6.  
Rolls, E. T., Critchley, H. D., Wakeman, E., & Mason, R. (1996). Responses of neurons 
in the primate taste cortex to the glutamate ion and to inosine 5′-monophosphate. 
Physiology & Behavior, 59(4), 991-1000.  
Russell, T. A., Schmidt, U., Doherty, L., Young, V., & Tchanturia, K. (2009). Aspects of 
social cognition in anorexia nervosa: Affective and cognitive theory of mind. 
Psychiatry Research, 168(3), 181-185.  
Rutter, M., Bailey, A., & Lord, C. (2003). The Social Communication Questionnaire: 
Manual: Western Psychological Services. 
Sarinopoulos, I., Grupe, D., Mackiewicz, K., Herrington, J., Lor, M., Steege, E., & 
Nitschke, J. (2010). Uncertainty during anticipation modulates neural responses to 
aversion in human insula and amygdala. Cerebral Cortex, 20(4), 929.  
Sasson, N. J., Dichter, G. S., & Bodfish, J. W. (2012). Affective responses by adults with 
autism are reduced to social images but elevated to images related to 
circumscribed interests. PLoS One, 7(8), e42457.  
Sasson, N. J., Elison, J. T., Turner-Brown, L. M., Dichter, G. S., & Bodfish, J. W. (2011). 
Brief Report: Circumscribed Attention in Young Children with Autism. Journal 
of autism and developmental disorders, 41(2), 242-247.  
  
	   110	  
Sasson, N. J., Tsuchiya, N., Hurley, R., Couture, S. M., Penn, D. L., Adolphs, R., & 
Piven, J. (2007). Orienting to social stimuli differentiates social cognitive 
impairment in autism and schizophrenia. Neuropsychologia, 45(11), 2580-2580.  
Sasson, N. J., Turner Brown, L. M., Holtzclaw, T. N., Lam, K. S. L., & Bodfish, J. W. 
(2008). Children with autism demonstrate circumscribed attention during passive 
viewing of complex social and nonsocial picture arrays. Autism Research, 1(1), 
31-42.  
Schienle, A., Kochel, A., Ebner, F., Reishofer, G., & Schafer, A. (2010). Neural 
correlates of intolerance of uncertainty. Neuroscience Letters, 479(3), 272-276.  
Schienle, A., Schäfer, A., Pignanelli, R., & Vaitl, D. (2009). Worry tendencies predict 
brain activation during aversive imagery. Neuroscience Letters, 461(3), 289-292.  
Schlösser, R., Nenadic, I., Wagner, G., Zysset, S., Koch, K., & Sauer, H. (2009). 
Dopaminergic modulation of brain systems subserving decision making under 
uncertainty: a study with fMRI and methylphenidate challenge. Synapse, 63(5), 
429-442.  
Schultz, T. M., & Berkson, G. (1995). Definition of abnormal focused affections and 
exploration of their relation to abnormal stereotyped behaviors. American Journal 
on Mental Retardation, 99(4), 376-390.  
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of prediction and 
reward. Science, 275(5306), 1593-1599.  
Schultz, W., & Dickinson, A. (2000). Neuronal coding of prediction errors. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 23(1), 473-500.  
Scott-Van Zeeland, A. A., Dapretto, M., Ghahremani, D. G., Poldrack, R. A., & 
Bookheimer, S. Y. (2010). Reward processing in autism. Autism Research, 3(2), 
53-67.  
Seeley, W. W., Menon, V., Schatzberg, A. F., Keller, J., Glover, G. H., Kenna, H., . . . 
Greicius, M. D. (2007). Dissociable Intrinsic Connectivity Networks for Salience 
Processing and Executive Control. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(9), 2349-
2356.  
  
	   111	  
Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Koltzenburg, M., Jones, A. K., Dolan, R. J., . . . 
Frackowiak, R. S. (2004). Temporal difference models describe higher-order 
learning in humans. Nature, 429(6992), 664-667.  
Sherer, M. R., & Schreibman, L. (2005). Individual behavioral profiles and predictors of 
treatment effectiveness for children with autism. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 73(3), 525-538.  
Simmons, A., Matthews, S. C., Paulus, M. P., & Stein, M. B. (2008). Intolerance of 
uncertainty correlates with insula activation during affective ambiguity. 
Neuroscience Letters, 430(2), 92-97.  
Sinha, P., Kjelgaard, M. M., Gandhi, T. K., Tsourides, K., Cardinaux, A. L., Pantazis, 
D., . . . Held, R. M. (2014). Autism as a disorder of prediction. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 111(42), 15220-15225.  
Smith, S. M. (2002). Fast robust automated brain extraction. Human Brain Mapping, 
17(3), 143-155.  
Smith, S. M., Jenkinson, M., Woolrich, M. W., Beckmann, C. F., Behrens, T. E. J., 
Johansen-Berg, H., . . . Flitney, D. E. (2004). Advances in functional and 
structural MR image analysis and implementation as FSL. Neuroimage, 23, 208-
219.  
South, M., Dana, J., White, S. E., & Crowley, M. J. (2011). Failure is not an option: Risk-
taking is moderated by anxiety and also by cognitive ability in children and 
adolescents diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 41(1), 55-65.  
South, M., Ozonoff, S., & McMahon, W. M. (2005). Repetitive behavior profiles in 
Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 35(2), 145-158.  
Spreckley, M., & Boyd, R. (2009). Efficacy of applied behavioral intervention in 
preschool children with autism for improving cognitive, language, and adaptive 
behavior: a systematic review and meta-analysis. The Journal of Pediatrics, 
154(3), 338-344.  
  
	   112	  
Sridharan, D., Levitin, D. J., & Menon, V. (2008). A critical role for the right fronto-
insular cortex in switching between central-executive and default-mode networks. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(34), 12569-12574.  
Steele, S. D., Minshew, N. J., Luna, B., & Sweeney, J. A. (2007). Spatial working 
memory deficits in autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
37(4), 605-612.  
Steketee, G., Frost, R. O., & Cohen, I. (1998). Beliefs in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 12(6), 525-537.  
Sterling, L., Renno, P., Storch, E. A., Ehrenreich-May, J., Lewin, A. B., Arnold, E., . . . 
Wood, J. (2014). Validity of the Revised Children’s Anxiety and Depression 
Scale for youth with autism spectrum disorders. Autism, 1362361313510066.  
Stern, E. R., Welsh, R. C., Gonzalez, R., Fitzgerald, K. D., Abelson, J. L., & Taylor, S. F. 
(2012). Subjective uncertainty and limbic hyperactivation in obsessive‐
compulsive disorder. Human Brain Mapping.  
Sternheim, L., Startup, H., & Schmidt, U. (2011). An experimental exploration of 
behavioral and cognitive–emotional aspects of intolerance of uncertainty in eating 
disorder patients. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 25(6), 806-812.  
Strain, P. S., Kerr, M. M., & Ragland, E. U. (1979). Effects of peer-mediated social 
initiations and prompting/reinforcement procedures on the social behavior of 
autistic children. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 9(1), 41-54.  
Sugam, J. A., Saddoris, M. P., & Carelli, R. M. (2014). Nucleus accumbens neurons track 
behavioral preferences and reward outcomes during risky decision making. 
Biological Psychiatry, 75(10), 807-816.  
Sutton, S. K., & Davidson, R. J. (1997). Prefrontal brain asymmetry: A biological 
substrate of the behavioral approach and inhibition systems. Psychological 
Science, 8(3), 204-210.  
Tobler, P. N., O'Doherty, J. P., Dolan, R. J., & Schultz, W. (2007). Reward value coding 
distinct from risk attitude-related uncertainty coding in human reward systems. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 97(2), 1621-1632.  
  
	   113	  
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Brigidi, B. D., & Foa, E. B. (2003). Intolerance of 
uncertainty in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 17(2), 
233-242.  
Tomarken, A. J., & Zald, D. H. (2009). Conceptual, methodological, and empirical 
ambiguities in the linkage between anger and approach: comment on Carver and 
Harmon-Jones (2009). Psychological Bulletin, 135(2), 209-214.  
Tottenham, N., Tanaka, J. W., Leon, A. C., McCarry, T., Nurse, M., Hare, T. A., . . . 
Nelson, C. (2009). The NimStim set of facial expressions: Judgments from 
untrained research participants. Psychiatry Research, 168(3), 242-249.  
Turner-Brown, L. M., Lam, K. S. L., Holtzclaw, T. N., Dichter, G. S., & Bodfish, J. W. 
(2011). Phenomenology and measurement of circumscribed interests in autism 
spectrum disorders. Autism, 15(4), 437-456.  
Tymula, A., Belmaker, L. A. R., Roy, A. K., Ruderman, L., Manson, K., Glimcher, P. W., 
& Levy, I. (2012). Adolescents’ risk-taking behavior is driven by tolerance to 
ambiguity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(42), 17135-
17140.  
Van de Cruys, S., Evers, K., Van der Hallen, R., & Van, L. (2014). Precise minds in 
uncertain worlds: Predictive coding in autism. Psychological Review, 121(4), 649-
675.  
Van Leijenhorst, L., Zanolie, K., Van Meel, C. S., Westenberg, P. M., Rombouts, S., & 
Crone, E. A. (2010). What motivates the adolescent? Brain regions mediating 
reward sensitivity across adolescence. Cerebral Cortex, 20(1), 61-69.  
Volz, K. G., Schubotz, R. I., & Cramon, D. (2005). Variants of uncertainty in decision-
making and their neural correlates. Brain Research Bulletin, 67(5), 403-412.  
Volz, K. G., Schubotz, R. I., & Von Cramon, D. Y. (2003). Predicting events of varying 
probability: Uncertainty investigated by fMRI. Neuroimage, 19(2), 271-280.  
Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I., & Taylor, S. F. (2003). Valence, gender, and 
lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: a meta-analysis of findings 
from neuroimaging. Neuroimage, 19(3), 513-531.  
  
	   114	  
Waltz, J. A., Frank, M. J., Robinson, B. M., & Gold, J. M. (2007). Selective 
reinforcement learning deficits in schizophrenia support predictions from 
computational models of striatal-cortical dysfunction. Biological Psychiatry, 
62(7), 756-764.  
Ward, B. D. (2000). Simultaneous inference for fMRI data. AFNI 3dDeconvolve 
Documentation, Medical College of Wisconsin.  
White, R. G., & Gumley, A. I. (2009). Postpsychotic posttraumatic stress disorder: 
Associations with fear of recurrence and intolerance of uncertainty. The Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 197(11), 841-849.  
White, R. G., & Gumley, A. I. (2010). Intolerance of uncertainty and distress associated 
with the experience of psychosis. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research and Practice, 83(3), 317-324.  
White, S. W., Oswald, D., Ollendick, T., & Scahill, L. (2009). Anxiety in children and 
adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Clinical Psychology Review, 29, 216-
229.  
Wigham, S., Rodgers, J., South, M., McConachie, H., & Freeston, M. (2014). The 
interplay between sensory processing abnormalities, intolerance of uncertainty, 
anxiety and restricted and repetitive behaviours in autism spectrum disorder. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 1-10.  
Wise, R. A. (1996). Addictive drugs and brain stimulation reward. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 19(1), 319-340.  
Yassa, M. A., Hazlett, R. L., Stark, C. E. L., & Hoehn-Saric, R. (2012). Functional MRI 
of the amygdala and bed nucleus of the stria terminalis during conditions of 
uncertainty in generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 
46(8), 1045-1052.  
Zink, C. F., Pagnoni, G., Martin, M. E., Dhamala, M., & Berns, G. S. (2003). Human 
striatal response to salient nonrewarding stimuli. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
23(22), 8092-8097.  
 
 
 
